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HARMLESS ERROR: CONSTITUTIONAL SNEAK THIEF 
STEVEN H. GOLDBERG* I 
"Harmless constitutional error" is among the 
most insidious of legal doctrines. Since its promul- 
gation by the United States Supreme Court in 
Chapman v. California,' it has determined as many 
criminal appeals as have some of the more well- 
known and hotly debated decisions of the 1960s.~ 
Despite the frequency of its use in determining 
criminal appeals-possibly as high as ten percent 
of all criminal appeals during the last thirteen 
years3-it has received comparatively little critical 
* Assistant Professor, University of Arkansas at  Little 
Rock School of Law; J.D., University of Minnesota, 1968; 
B.A., Northwestern University, 1963. 
' 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
It is probably impossible to determine exactly how 
many cases have been "determined" by a prior precedent. 
Shepard's United Shtes Cihtions lists in excess of 6000 
citations to Chapman v. Cali/omia While some of those 
citations probably represent cases which found the error 
"harmful," Chapman is almost always cited as authority 
for an appellate court's finding of "harmlessness." A 
rough comparison with the page measure of the citations 
to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1969, two of the major decisions 
of the Warren Court, supports the proposition that Chap- 
man has determined as many cases as almost any prece- 
dent from the decade. While both Miranda and Mapp are 
cited more often, they are more often distinguished or 
explained and frequently appear numerous times in the 
same case. 
'The empirical research to establish the exact rela- 
tionship between harmless constitutional error determi- 
nations and all criminal appeals is probably not worth 
the effort. The available data and a couple of assumptions 
make a fair argument for the likelihood of the 10 percent 
estimate. While the Shepard's citations undoubtedly in- 
clude some cases of harmful error and some multiple 
citations in the same case, a number of cases are deter- 
mined by a finding of harmless constitutional error with- 
out any mention of Chapman. Harrington v. California, 
395 U.S. 250 (1969), provided a less rigorous test than 
Chapman and is often cited in preference to Chapman 
Similarly, many state courts cite the state authority for 
harmless constitutional error rather than Chapman. It is 
not unreasonable to assume that the cases which do not 
cite Chapman for the harmless error proposition are at  
least as numerous as those that do and do not find the 
error harmless. Something in excess of two-thirds of the 
Shepard's citations to Chapman are in state cases. 
The available data for harmless error as a percentage 
of appellate decisions is found in Note, Harmful Use of 
Harmless Error in Criminal Cares, 64 CORNELL . REV. 538 
(1979) (hereinafter Harmful Use). The Note presents a 
comparison of all federal cases mentioning harmless error 
to all cases in the federal circuits from 1960 through 1978. 
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attention4 The reason for the inattention? It's a 
sneak thief. Its appearance does not raise appre- 
hension, and its application does not leave concen- 
trated areas of obvious constitutional damage. The 
doctrine does not aim at any closely guarded right. 
It poses no consistent doctrinal challenge to impor- 
tant judicial determinations; nor does it consist- 
ently affect any police practice. Further, it looks 
like the helpful, familiar doctrine of harmless error. 
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that 
The data do not discriminate between harmless error and 
harmless constitutional error. The markedly increased 
percentage, and the even more dramatic increase in 
absolute number of harmless error cases following the 
Chapman opinion, when combined with the observation 
that there is a rough approximation between the number 
of federal harmless error cases presented in Harmful Use, 
supra, and the federal citations in Shepard's for the same 
period, lead to the conclusion that the number of harm- 
less error cases which are not harmless constitutional 
error is statistically insignificant. 
During the last decade, civil cases outnumbered crim- 
inal cases in the federal circuits approximately four-to- 
one. See DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL AB- 
STRACC OF THE UNITED STATES (1979). In Harmful Use, 
supra, theauthor estimates that 2.5 percent ofall appellate 
cases in the federal system are harmless error cases. If the 
civil-to-criminal ratio in the states is comparable to that 
of the federal system, then approximately 10 percent of 
all criminal appellate cases throughout the country are 
determined by a finding of harmless constitutional error. 
Granting that the figure represents the roughest of ap- 
proximations, the harmless constitutional error doctrine 
is apparently a significant factor, at  least by volume, in 
criminal appellate decisionmaking. 
When compared to the other major decisions of the 
1960s, the harmless error case was ignored. The most 
complete discussion of harmless error is R. TRAYNOR, THE 
RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR (1970). Field, Assessing the 
Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error-A Process in Need 
of a Rationah, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 15 (1977); Mause, 
Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of Chapman v. 
California, 53 MINN. L. REV. 519 (1969); and Saltzburg, 
The Ham of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REV. 988 (1973), 
each deal with a particular aspect of the harmless consti- 
tutional error problem. A handful of student notes and 
comments, the most complete of which is Note, Harmless 
Constitutional Error, 20 STAN. L. REV. 83 (1967), com- 
mented on the Chapman decision. While many of the 
commentators presented a case for excluding one kind of 
error or another from the reach of the harmless consti- 
tutional error doctrine, none criticized the doctrine as 
being simply wrong. 
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the doctrine of harmless constitutional error de- 
stroys important constitutional and institutional 
values and therefore should be discarded. 
The  lack of apparent concern for the doctrine of 
harmless constitutional error is attributable, at  
least in part, to the assumption that harmless con- 
stitutional error is simply another variety of harm- 
less error. In fashioning a "harmless-constitutional- 
error rulef15 for the seven-member Chapman major- 
ity, Justice Hugo Black made a special attempt to 
tie his new rule to the harmless error statutes extant 
in the various jurisdictions: "All 50 States have 
harmless-error statutes or rules, and the United 
States long ago through its Congress established 
for its courts the rule that judgments shall not be 
reversed for 'errors or  defects which do not affect 
the substantial rights of the parties.' "6 
Harmless constitutional error is different from 
harmless error generally, and that difference begins 
with the statutes and rules in the fifty states. The  
various harmless error statutes state, in one fashion 
or another, that a trial result shall not be reversed 
on appeal unless the trial included a "substantial 
wrong or m i ~ c a r r i a ~ e . " ~  The  language and the 
concept originated in England. T h e  method and 
reason for its eventual transplantation to the 
United States bears upon whether harmless error 
is a persuasive precedent for the harmless consti- 
tutional error doctrine. 
Commentators generally believe the 1835 case of 
Crease v. ~ a n e t e  created the Exchequer Rule which 
states that prejudice presumptively attends every 
trial error.g The  rule resulted in such overcrowding 
in the English courts that litigation seemed to 
survive until the parties expired. Faced with more 
retrials than new trials, the English created a harm- 
less error rule for civil litigation which prohibited 
reversal absent substantial wrong. 
The  American courts adopted the Exchequer 
386 U.S. at 22. The phrase is Justice Black's own 
description of what Justice Stewart considered to be a 
"break with settled precedent." Id. at 22 (quoting id. at 
45 (Powell, J., dissenting)). 
7 
Id. at 22 (quoting 28 U.S.C. 21 11 (1966)). 
See 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, rule 6, sched. 1. (1873). 
8 1 C.M. & R. 919, 149 Eng. Rep. 1353 (Ex. 1835). 
9 Wigmore first blamed Crease for the rule, and most 
commentators have accepted that genealogy. R. TRAY- 
NOR, supra note 4, at 4, argues persuasively that the 
Exchequer Rule was not invented by Baron Parke in 
Creme, but rather by the judges who misread the prece- 
dent in applying Crease to the case of the moment. 
Rule and developed the same backlog and delay 
that plagued the English. Unlike the English, how- 
ever, the American courts did not change the rule 
and even in the early twentieth century were still 
leaving no error unremedied, no matter how incon- 
sequential. Commentators labeled the courts "im- 
pregnable citadels of t e~hn ica l i t~ , " '~  and by all 
accounts the label was warranted. Cases were often 
tried more than once-and once, five times." Con- 
victions were overturned for matters as inconse- 
quential as the omission of the word "the" before 
the words "peace and dignity" in an indictment.'* 
One  particularly glaring example of delay involved 
a widow who, twenty-three years after filing suit 
for the proceeds of her husband's life insurance, 
appeared before the Supreme Court for the second 
time.I3 Many lawyers placed error in the record as 
a hedge against losing the verdict.'* The situation 
- - 
in the courts became intolerable to many members 
of the organized bar, some judges, and a number 
of legal scholars. They formed a loose coalition to 
press for remedial legislation.15 T h e  reform move- 
ment resulted in "harmless error" legislation in 
virtually e~er~jur isdic t ion . '~  In the words of Justice 
lo Kavanaugh, Improvment of Administration of Criminal 
Justice ly Exercise of Judicial Power, 11 A.B.A.J. 217, 222 
(1 925). 
l1 Pressley v. Bloomington and Normal Ry. & Light 
Co., 271 Ill. 622, i 11 N.E. 51 1 (1916), was retried four 
times without a substantial error. 
'*state v. Campbell, 210 Mo. 202, 109 S.W. 706 
(1908). 
l3 Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. v. Hillmori, 145 U.S. 
285 (1892), 188 U.S. 208 (1903), might have become a 
national tragedy had the "widow" not been very young- 
and thereby likely to outlive the lawsuit to spend her 
winnings-and had there been no suspicion that her 
husband was not really a "corpse" and she, therefore, not 
really a "widow." 
14 There was considerable pressure to create a federal 
harmless error statute with application to civil cases only. 
See S. REP. NO. 1066, 62nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1911-12). 
Criminal cases were nonetheless included because, ac- 
cording to Justice Rutledge in Kotteakos v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 750, 759 (1946), the "criminal trial 
became a game for sowing reversible error in the record, 
only to have repeated the same matching of wits when a 
new trial had been thus obtained." 
l5 The organized bar spearheaded the coalition, aided 
by its powerful, if not succinctly named, Special Com- 
mittee to Suggest Remedies and Formulate Proposed 
Laws to Prevent Delay and Unnecessary Cost in Litiga- 
tion. Pound, Taft, Wigrnore, Hadley, and Frankfurter 
were only some of the legal community leaders involved 
in the coalition. 
l6 Some of the harmless error rules, for instance the 
California constitutional harmless error rule, antedated 
the reform movement. Most of the statutes and rules, 
however, were passed during the quarter century in which 
the coalition was actively involved in lobbying. 
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Frankfurter the purpose and limits of the harmless 
error legislation were: "to prevent matters con- 
cerned with the mere etiquette of trials and with 
the formalities and minutiae of procedure from 
touching the merits of a verdict."17 
With this background, the issue of harmless 
constitutional error came to the Supreme Court in 
1963. Until Fahy v. Connecticut," no court had sug- 
gested that a federal constitutional error might be 
harmless. The Court had never given any serious 
consideration to the question, and no constitutional 
error had gone unremedied by re~ersal.'~ Fahy 
came to the Court in the backwash of Mapp v. 
Ohioz0 as the states were beginning to struggle with 
the proposition that the fourth amendment limi- 
tations upon search and seizure, and the exclusion- 
ary rule remedy for violation of those limitations, 
were fully applicable to the states. The state 
charged Fahy and a friend with painting swastikas 
on a synagogue in violation of its law against 
willful injury to public buildings. At Fahy's trial, 
the state introduced the paint and brush used for 
the artwork. On appeal, the Connecticut court held 
that the search for and seizure of the paint and 
brush from the Fahy garage violated the fourth 
amendment and that Mapp required their exclusion 
from evidence?' The court refused, however, to 
reverse the conviction, holding that the error in the 
admission of the paint and brush had not "mater- 
ially injured the appellant" under Connecticut's 
harmless error rule." 
The Supreme Court might have pursued several 
alternatives in Fahy. It could have decided that 
federal constitutional error never could be harm- 
" 308 U.S. 287,294 (1939). 
l8 375 U.S. 85 (1963). 
19 See, e.g., Gibbs, Prejudicial Error: Admissions and Exclu- 
sions ojEvidence in the Fcdcral Courts, 3 VILL. L. REV. 48,67 
(1957). Justice Harlan, dissenting in Chapman, cited Motes 
v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900), in response to 
Justice Stewart's claim that constitutional error had al- 
ways led to reversal. 386 U.S. at 50. Saltzburg, supra note 
4, at 1001, suggests that Motes may not have been viewed 
as anything more than a waiver of constitutional rights 
through Motes' admission of guilt, which amounted to a 
guilty plea. Regardless of Motes' "true" meaning, the 
matter of harmless constitutional error was never raised 
or argued in the Supreme Court before Fahy. Justice 
Rutledge, in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. at 764- 
65, said in dictum that only constitutional norms and 
specific commands of Congress could insulate error from 
the federal harmless error statute. 
n, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
Connecticut v. Fahy, 149 Conn. 577,586, 183 A.2d 
256, 261 (1962). 
Id. at 588, 183 A.2d at 262; CONN. GEN. STAT. 5 52- 
265 (1958). 
less. It could have decided that courts should judge 
federal constitutional error by a federal standard 
of harmlessness. It might have separated the exclu- 
sionary rule from the fourth amendment and de- 
termined that the admission of the evidence was 
not constitutional error. The Court chose none of 
these alternatives. Instead the Court held that Fahv 
was entitled to a new trial because the Connecticut 
court wrongly believed that the admission of the 
evidence would not prejudice Fahy.23 Chief Justice 
Warren, writing for the majority, failed to clarify 
the basis of the Court's power to instruct a state on 
the interpretation of its own la\v~.'~ More impor- 
tantly, the opinion is not clear on whether con- 
necticut read its facts right and its test wrong or its 
test right and its facts wrong.25 The single clear 
proposition to be gleaned from Fahy is that, had 
the Connecticut court done its job correctly, it 
might have found the federal constitutional error 
to be harmless. 
Chapman v. Californi~?~ the "harmless error" case, 
came four years after Fahy. Significantly, Chapman 
did not involve a fourth amendment violation. 
Justices Stewart and White, who had joined Justice 
Harlan's dissent in Fahy, did not join him in Chap- 
man. Insofar as Justice Harlan's position was not 
significantly different on the relationship between 
harmless error and constitutional error, it is fair to 
conclude that the fourth amendment exclusionary 
rule presents special problems for harmless error.27 
23 "From the foregoing it clearly appears that the 
erroneous admission of this illegally obtained evidence 
was prejudicial to petitioner and hence it cannot be 
called harmless error." 375 U.S. at 91-92. 
24 Justice Harlan in dissent questioned the Court's 
power to' instruct Connecticut upon the proper interpre- 
tation of its own harmless error statute. "Evidentiary 
questions of this sort are not a proper part of this Court's 
business, particularly in cases coming here from state 
courts over which this Court possesses no supervisory 
power." Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. at 92 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
25 The majority opinion goes out of its way to discuss 
the facts. However, as the dissent points out, reinterpret- 
ing the facts is not the task of the United States Supreme 
Court. Although Connecticut's statute is potentially as 
rigorous for harmless error as any test the Court might 
promulgate, the opinion states a harmless error test dif- 
ferent from that which Connecticut applied under its 
own statute. The test which Warren stated in framing 
the "factual" issue placed the burden on the state to show 
no "reasonable possibility" that the error contributed to 
the verdict. It is unlikely that Connecticut read its harm- 
less error test similarly. 
26 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
The exclusionary rule presents special problems in 
a number of contexts. A familiar contention is that most 
of the procedural cases, see, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 
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Chapman involved California's constitutional rule 
which allowed the prosecutor to argue to the jury 
the defendant's failure to testify.2s Chapman and 
a codefendant were charged with a number of 
crimes, including murder. They chose not to testify 
at their trial, and the prosecutor made a vigorous 
argument based upon their failure to explain and 
contradict the state's evidence. After their trial, but 
before their appeal, the United States Supreme 
Court decided Gr;ff;n u. In Grzff;n, the 
Court held that the California comment rule un- 
constitutionally eroded the fifth amendment priv- 
ilege against self-incrimination by making its asser- 
tion costly. The California Supreme Court recog- 
nized the applicability of Grtffin to Chapman's 
case, but held that under California's test for harm- 
less error the comment to the jury was harmless.30 
The Chapman opinion is, in its own fashion, as 
strange as Fahy. Justice Harlan, who did not un- 
derstand the source of the Fahy Court's power to 
instruct Connecticut on its own law, had similar 
difficulty with the source of the Chapman Court's 
power to create a federal harmless error standard, 
particularly, given Justice Black's observation that 
Congress might impose a different ~tandard.~ '  He 
concluded that the majority, in a "startling consti- 
tutional development" had assumed "a general 
supervisory power over the trial of federal consti- 
tutional issues in state Former Chief 
Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court 
read Justice Black's opinion quite differently, con- 
cluding that the Chapman rule was not constitution- 
U.S. 618 (1965), and Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 
(1976), represent reactions to the exclusionary principle 
rather than antipathy to the right involved. Chapman, 
although not an exclusionary rule case, was decided with 
the exclusionary rule in the very near background. Fur- 
ther, the exclusionary rule significantly affected the de- 
cision to the extent that it tempered Stewart's otherwise 
uncompromising position that constitutional error was 
different as a class for purposes of harmless error. 
ur CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13. 
" 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
30 People v. Teale, 63 Cal. 2d 178, 404 ~ : 2 d  209, 45 
Cal. Rptr. 729 (1965). 
386 U.S. a t  45 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The limits of 
federal power-and certainly court power-is the central 
theme of Justice Harlan's dissent. He makes the argument 
more completely than he did in Fahy. His dissent, and 
the failure of Justices Stewart and White to join it, is the 
best a rpment  for two propositions: (1) the exclusionary 
rule alone accounted for the Court's avoidance of the 
harmless error issue in Fahy, and (2) the Chapman deter- 
mination that federal constitutional error requires a dif- 
ferent and more rigorous harmless error test is a "consti- 
tutional judgment." 
'' Id. at  45,46. 
ally based but rather was an interpretation of the 
federal harmless error statute.33 
Much of the difficulty with Chapman is the result 
of its posture in the Supreme Court, the positions 
of the parties, and the Court's response to those 
positions.34 The California Supreme Court appar- 
ently had concluded that the evidence of guilt 
presented to the jury was so "ovenvhelming" that 
the error was harmless.35 The state contended that 
its harmless error rule represented the proper test. 
The defendant contended that no constitutional 
error could ever be harmles~?~ The majority opin- 
ion rejected both contentions and f&hioned a fed- 
eral harmless error standard. In so doing, Justice 
Black held that federal constitutional error was 
sufficiently different from common error to require 
a different but not sufficiently different 
to prohibit any standard at all.38 For the latter 
33 R. TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at 38-42. 
In the most technical sense, the language in Chapman 
concerning the nature of the harmless constitutional error 
may be considered dictum. Chapman is the authority used 
by many appellate courts to find harmless constitutional 
error, but Chapman did not find such an error. The 
California court found the error to be harmless; the 
United States Supreme Court found only that Califor- 
nia's use of its own test for harmlessness was wrong. 
Whether Chapman disapproved the California test or 
the way the California courts were interpreting that test 
is unclear. The  issue of whether there is a difference 
between the "ovenvhelming evidence" and the "effect of 
the evidence" tests, and whether that difference matters, 
is born in Chapman: "The California.constitutional rule 
emphasizes 'a miscarriage of justice,' but the California 
courts have neutralized this to some extent by emphasis, 
and perhaps overemphasis, upon the court's view of 
'ovenvhelming evidence.' We prefer the approach of this 
Court in deciding what was harmless error in our recent 
case of Fahy v. Connecticut." 386 U.S. a t  23. 
36 The defense maintained an alternative position that 
if all constitutional error did not require automatic re- 
versal, the error in their particular case was prejudicial. 
That position eventually prevailed. For the purpose of 
this article, the first position, automatic reversal, is of 
interest. 
37 With faithfulness to the constitutional union of 
the States, we cannot leave to the States the for- 
mulation of the authoritative laws, rules, and rem- 
edies designed to protect people from infractions by 
the States of federally guaranteed [constitutional] 
rights.. . . In the absence of appropriate congres- 
sional action, it is our responsibility to protect [fed- 
eral constitutional rights] by fashioning the neces- 
sary rule. 
386 U.S. at 21. 
%All of these rules, state or federal, serve a very 
useful purpose insofar as they block setting aside 
convictions for small errors or defects that have 
little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result 
of the trial. We conclude that there may be some 
constitutional errors which in the setting of a par- 
ticular case are so unimportant and insignificant 
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proposition, he relied upon the harmless error stat- 
utes of the fifty states, observing that they failed to 
distinguish "between federal constitutional errors 
and errors of state law or federal statutes and 
rules."39 These were the same harmless error stat- 
utes which he found inadequately designed to pro- 
tect federally guaranteed rights?' Commentators 
have observed that Chapman might be read to reject 
the method of measure-"ovenvhelming evi- 
dence"-the California court used in applying its 
harmless error statute?' Others havesuggested that 
the Chapman test is the measure for the federal 
harmless error statute?'Some have concluded that 
the Chapman rule is a new constitutional incursion 
into matters properly the sole concern of the 
~tates.4~ Still others have suggested that a later case, 
In  re Winrh i~ ,~  requires application of the Chapman 
rule for all error-constitutional or not-in a crim- 
inal trial. 
The Chapman test for harmless constitutional er- 
ror, regardless of its foundation orjustification, was 
the same test that Chief Justice Warren had "sug- 
gested" to the Connecticut court in Fahy: "Before 
a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, 
the court must be able to declare a belief that it 
was harmless beyond a reasonable In 
that they may, consistent with the Federal Consti- 
tution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the au- 
tomatic reversal of the conviction. 
Id. at 22. 
39 "All 50 States have harmless-error statutes or rules, 
and the United States long ago through its Congress 
established for its courts the rule thatjudgments shall not 
be reversed for 'errors or defects which do not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties."' Id. 
" Id. 
4' Much of Justice Brennan's dissent in Harrington v. 
California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969), takes this approach 
although it does not suggest that the California rule is at 
issue. Field, supra note 4, contains an extensive discussion 
of the "ovenvhelming evidence'' measure and its appli- 
cability to current harmless error cases. 
42 R. TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at 37-42. 
"Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 45-46 (Harlan, 
J., dissenting). 
44 397 U.S. 358 (1970). See Saltzburg, supra note 4, at 
991. Professor Saltzburg's argument that any method of 
"ovenvhelming evidence" examination requires the ap- 
pellate court to use a reasonable doubt test in order to 
comply with due process is persuasive. Id. at 1009-20. 
This position takes no account of the "class" of the error, 
but focuses upon the appellate fact review function and 
demands that the appellate jury be bound by the same 
test as the petit jury. He might have canied his point 
further. See text accompanying notes 64-109 infra for a 
discussion of the appropriateness of any appellate fact- 
finding in a criminal case. 
45 386 U.S. at 24. 
adopting the Fahy test explicitly, Justice Black 
observed that "the beneficiary of a constitutional 
error" camed the burden of demonstrating that 
the error "did not contribute to the verdict."46 
Save for the reference to the harmless error 
statutes which grew out of the law reform move- 
ment of the early twentieth century, Justice Black 
presented no authority for the proposition that a 
constitutional violation might be harmless. His 
brief discussion of the statutes presents no clues as 
to what it is about their enactment or their foun- 
dation which would theoretically support a harm- 
less constitutional error rule."7 
Ironically, Justice Stewart, who dissented from 
the Court's interference with Connecticut's appli- 
cation of its own harmless error statute to the 
unconstitutional search in Fahy, and dissented from 
the Court's determination that the California com- 
ment rule "cost" Gn3n anything he had not pre- 
viously spent;" argued that the Gnfln error, being 
constitutional, required automatic reversal of 
Chapman's conviction. Justice Stewart's Chapman 
concurrence emphasized that, despite ample op- 
portunity, the Court had never paused to inquire 
if a constitutional violation was harmful, reversing 
in most instances in which such a violation was 
found. He was not, however, willing to draw the 
harmlessness line between constitutional error and 
all other error. Noting that GnDn error did not 
present the appropriate vehicle for breaking with 
"settled precedent,"49 Justice Stewart indicated a 
willingness to place exclusionary rule error in the 
"all other" category.50 
46 Id. 
47 ~ustice Black sat on both the Bruno and Kottcakos 
Courts and was as familiar as anyone with the history 
and purpose of the harmless error statutes which devel- 
oped out of the law reform movement. He undoubtedly 
knew that the reason the statutes made no distinction 
between constitutional error and common error was that 
nobody proposing or passing the statutes ever dreamed 
that anybody would ever suggest that the "minutiae" 
with which they were dealing would include a constitu- 
tional guarantee. One can only speculate that Justice 
Black felt the need of some historical support and 
clutched at the first arguably relevant straw. 
48 Stewart's G n z n  dissent was essentially a harmless- 
ness approach in the first instance. He could not see how 
telling a jury something they already knew-that the 
defendant had not testified-could matter in the result. 
He was, therefore, unwilling to agree that the exercise of 
the fifth amendment right cost anything. 380 U.S. at 
620-21 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
49 386 U.S. at 45. 
Justice Stewart says that "constitutional rights are 
not fungible goods" as a preface to his position that while 
automatic reversal has been the rule, the right case might 
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Just-as Justice Stewart seemed to be willing to 
include certain constitutional error on the harmless 
error side, Justice Black seemed to concede that 
certain constitutional error requires automatic re- 
versal. Without embracing the precedents, Black 
observed that "prior cases have indicated that there 
are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial 
that their infraction can never be treated as harm- 
less error."51 
Though Chapman may have left more questions 
than it answered, it established the possibility of a 
harmless constitutional error, wrapping the doc- 
trine in the cloak of that harmless error doctrine 
which, in Justice Frankfurter's words, dealt with 
the "minutiae of procedure."52 
Chapman received little notice when it was de- 
cided because many commentators agreed pri- 
vately with the public assessment that "the possi- 
bility that a particular error will be found 'harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt' seems slight." 530nly 
Justice Harlan expected Chapman to have any im- 
pact on judicial review of convictions, and his 
expectation was that the federal courts would be- 
come increasingly involved in what he considered 
to be "state-judicial domains."" Both predictions 
present a place for harmless error. His only example, and 
obvious choice for the place, is the exclusionary rule. 
While he speaks in terms of a constitutional right, it is 
clear that he does so by force of precedent rather than 
personal conviction. His footnote to the subject leads one 
to believe that he is more interested in returning the 
exclusionary rule to the realm of common error than he 
is in creating a harmless constitutional error rule. Id. at 
44 n.2. 
51 386 U.S. at  23. Justice Black cites three examples, 
id. at 23 n.8: Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) 
(right to counsel); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) 
(coerced confession), and Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 
(1927) (impartial judge). Justice Stewart cites additional 
instances in which automatic reversal is indicated. Justice 
Black gives no reason for those he selects, does not 
necessarily endorse the result, and provides no clue as to 
what characteristic unifies the cases past his "so basic to 
a fair trial" language. Given his total incorporation ap- 
proach to due process, see Adamson v. California, 332 
U.S. 46 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting), it is unlikely that 
he means to suggest that there is a constitutional differ- 
ence among rights found within the first eight amend- 
ments. His citation, like Justice Stewart's, may be the 
result of frustration with the process of trying to set a 
code of procedure from the Bill of Rights, and striking a 
reasonable balance between clear rules and flexible ap- 
plication. 
52 Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287,294 (1939). 
53 Thc Suprmc Court, 1967 Tm, 81 HARV. L. REV. 205 
(1967). 
51 386 U.S. at  57 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
were wrong. The "slight" possibility became a 
common occurrence in both the state and federal 
and the federal courts did not use Chapman 
as a tool for fixing their own notion of "harm" 
upon state courts with contrary views. There is 
some irony in the fact that, on the dontrary, Chap- 
man became the magic formula by which the state 
courts found harmless constitutional error in record 
numbers-findings to which the federal courts gave 
substantial deference.56 
Although Chapman remains the most commonly 
cited authority for the proposition that any partic- 
ular constitutional error is harmless, it may not be 
accurate to ascribe the significant evils of the doc- 
trine to the Chapman opinion. Although Chapman 
introduced the harmless constitutional error, the 
doctrine as presented possessed only the potential, 
not the doctrinal structure, for constitutional and 
institutional mischief. Traynor thought the Chap- 
man test to be so stringent as to be tantamount to 
an automatic reversal rule.57 Had the Supreme 
Court interpreted and the other appellate courts 
applied Chapman to allow a finding of harmlessness 
only after an appellate court had examined the 
error alone and found beyond a reasonable doubt 
that it could not have contributed to the verdict, 
the predictions of inconsequence might have 
proven correct. Cases decided after Chapman re- 
laxed the rigor of the test and applied it to circum- 
stances which could not have been contemplated, 
and indeed, would have been disavowed by the 
Chapman majority. 
Any new doctrine or exception to an established 
doctrine must be expected to grow past the param- 
eters set in the decision which created it. The 
harmless constitutional error doctrine has a char- 
% The data from Harmful Use, supra note 3, at  544-48, 
on the incidence of harmless error indicate the federal 
courts perhaps were as anxious as the state courts to use 
a mechanism which would allow them to find a consti- 
tutional error and still affirm the conviction. 
56Because a finding that an error is harmless is a 
factual determination, there is little realistic opportunity 
for review by the federal courts of a state appellate court 
decision. An interesting exception is the kind of case 
where the state appellate court finds an error harmless 
and the federal court need not second guess the state 
appellate court's reading of the statute in order to find 
that there was harm in the error. Allison v. Gray, 603 
F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1979), is an example of such a case. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the failure to 
allow a defendant to present alibi testimony was error, 
but harmless. Allison v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 14,214 N.W.2d 
437, cut. denied, 419 U.S. 1071 (1974).TheSeventhCircuit 
reversed, noting that the Wisconsin court could not pos- 
sibly judge the weight or effect of alibi evidence that was 
not in the record. 
57 R. TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at 43. 
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acteristic unique among doctrines with constitu- 
tional impact that makes such growth immediate, 
indiscriminate, and unpredictable. It has no sub- 
stantive doctrinal base. As a result, the doctrine has 
become a major thief of constitutional rights with- 
out any particular notice or analysis. Unlike the 
substantive constitutional decisions such as ~ a p p , ~ ~  
Mirand<' and or even the procedural con- 
stitutional decisions such as Linkletter v. walker:' 
harmless constitutional error carries with it no legal 
issue of primary concern to an appellant. Appel- 
lants are unable to launch a consistent and effective 
attack against the doctrine because no single ap- 
pellant has any doctrinal stake in the issue. Each 
appellant hopes only to avoid the factual trap of 
harmless constitutional error. He has little oppor- 
tunity to challenge on the factual issue, let alone 
on the propriety of the d~ctrine.~' Consequently, 
the courts failed to provide analysis in the devel- 
opment of harmless constitutional error. That fail- 
ure has created an appellate procedural doctrine 
which has caused "mischief'63 beyond anyone's 
expectations. The doctrine has created appellate 
factfinding which denies the constitutionally guar- 
anteed right to trial by jury. In addition, the 
doctrine erodes constitutional principles at all 
levels of the criminal justice system from prosecu- 
tion to Supreme Court review without ever afford- 
ing an opportunity for a hearing on the merits of 
the principle eroded. 
111. " . . . A FAMILIAR  STANDARD"^ 
.Justice Black's observation that the reasonable 
- 
doubt standard was a familiar one to appellate 
" Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (searches). 
69 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (confes- 
. . .  
sions). 
@'United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (line 
UPS). 
381 U.S. 618 (1965) (retroactivity). 
"The nature of the harmless error determination is 
such that an appellant cannot argue its inapplicability 
without an implicit concession that the inquiry is justified 
and without taking valuable time and energy away from 
persuading the court that there is error in the first 
instance. Further, few appeals proceed with the full 
record available to the appellate court or sufficient time 
for the appellant to adequately parse the record to estab- 
lish the harmlessness of an error that the appellate court 
has not yet found. 
Justice Black anticipated that harmless error rules 
could create "mischievous results when, for example, 
highly important and persuasive evidence, or argument, 
though legally forbidden, finds its way into a trial in 
which the question of guilt or innocence is a close one." 
386 U.S. at  22. He did not anticipate the mischief which 
the doctrine might bring to the appellate process or to 
constitutional guarantees. 
a "While appellate courts do not ordinarily have the 
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courts identifies precisely the problem which arose 
after the Supreme Court decided Harington v. Cal- 
i forn i~z .~~  Appellate courts never operate as fact- 
finders for matters which must be determined be- 
yond a reasonable doubt. They rarely operate as 
fact-finders at Most importantly, until the 
Court approved the "overwhelming evidence" ap- 
proach to harmless constitutional error, no court 
had the power to enter a guilty verdict on its own 
judgment when the defendant properly exercised 
his right to a trial by 
Because Chapman seemed to reject the California 
court's "ove&helming evidence" approach to 
harmless error, and to approve a test that required 
the court to focus instead on whether the error 
contributed to the verdict, Glenn Harrington's 
murder conviction would likely not stand. Har- 
rington, a caucasian, and three blacks were jointly 
tried and convicted of murder. Each of Harring- 
ton's alleged accomplices confessed. Their confes- 
sions were admitted at the trial in violation of the 
rule of Bruton v. United  state^,^' prohibiting the 
introduction, against a codefendant, of another's 
confession when that other individual did not take 
the stand and thereby submit to confrontation by 
his codefendant. It is difficult to imagine how any 
court, focusing only upon the illegally admitted 
confessions, could determine beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the confessions of the accomplices did 
not contribute to Harrington's conviction-partic- ' 
ularly when those confessions described the fourth 
participant as "the white guy."69 Harrington made 
original task of applying such a test, it is a familiar 
standard to all courts.. . . " Id. at 24. 
'' 395 U.S. 250 (1969). 
Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is 
exemplary of the reticence of appellate courts to review, 
let alone make initial determinations of fact. "Findings 
of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and 
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial 
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." FED. R. 
Crv. P. 52(a). 
QThe  appellate court's action in finding an error 
harmless by assessing the weight of the remainder of the 
evidence is not, in a technical sense, the direction of a 
verdict nor the granting of a judgment n.0.u. to the 
government. However, it is a determination of guilt upon 
facts which have never been considered by a iury and 
which, given the appellate court's finding okguilt,never 
will be. 
391 U.S. 123 (1968). 
*None of the defendants mentioned Hamngton by 
name. The Court, however, accepted Harrington's argu- 
ment that, when the defendants said "the white guy," 
there was not much doubt who the speaker had in mind 
as Harrington sat in the dock with three blacks. 395 U.S. 
at  253. 
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statements which, according to the Court, "fell 
short of a confession but which placed him at the 
scene of the crime."70 According to Justice Douglas, 
writing for a five-member majority, those state- 
ments and other evidence were "so overwhelming" 
that the admission of the co-defendant's 
confession was harmless beyond a reasonable 
d o ~ b t . ~ '  
The Harrington majority, which included Justice 
Black, the author of Chapman, stated emphatically 
that they did not "depart from Chapman; nor . . . 
dilute it by inferen~e."~' Justice Brennan, joined 
by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Marshall, took 
exception, contending that Chapman had been over- 
ruled: "The Court today by shifting the inquiry 
from whether the constitutional error contributed 
to theconviction to whether theuntainted evidence 
provided 'overwhelming' support for the convic- 
tion puts aside the firm resolve of Chapman. . . ."73 
Hanington was followed by the remarkably simi- 
lar case of Schneble v. ~ l o r i d a . ~ ~  Although the dissen- 
ters, including Justice Douglas, the author of Har- 
rington, complained bitterly that Schneble's reliance 
upon Harrington was misplaced, the majority used 
the "overwhelming evidence" approach that Jus- 
tice Douglas had adopted for the Hanington facts.75 
In addition, Justice Rehnquist's pointed use of 
language from the Hanington deci- 
sion, plus his own peculiar phrasing of the Chapman 
holding:7 left the burden of proof unclear, both as 
to what it was and who was to carry it. After 
Schneble, one may argue reasonably that an appel- 
late court faced with an error of constitutional 
'O Id. at 252. 
71 Id. at 254. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 255 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
74 405 U.S. 427 (1972). 
75 "Not only is the independent evidence of guilt here 
overwhelming, as in Hamngton.. . . " Id. at 431. 
"Although it is unlikely that Justice Douglas intended 
to change the test from beyond a reasonable doubt to one 
of probability, he used language in Harrington which 
Justice Rehnquist was able to use to support such a 
change: "Our own reading of the record and on what 
seems to us to have been the probable impact . . . on the 
minds of an average jury." Id. at 432 (quoting Harrington 
v. California, 395 U.S. at 254). 
77 Justice Black put the burden of demonstration upon 
the prosecution, "requiring the beneficiary of a constitu- 
tional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict 
obtained." 386 U.S. at  24. Justice Rehnquist implied that 
the demonstration must be made by the defendant: 
"Thus, unless there is a reasonable possibility that the 
improperly admitted evidence contributed to the convic- 
tion, reversal is not required." 405 U.S. at 432. 
dimension should make its own independent eval- 
uation of the evidence, and reverse the conviction 
only if it was persuaded that the average jury 
would have changed its verdict had the illegal 
evidence been e~cluded.~' By a subtle rearrange- 
ment of words and ideas, Justice Rehnquist con- 
verted a test which forced the prosecution to show 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not 
contribute to the verdict, into a test which forced 
the defendant to show that the error was of such 
significance that without it the defendant would 
be entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.?' 
Most of the commentary concerned with harm- 
less constitutional error has focused upon subclasses 
of constitutional rights which, in the minds of the 
commentators, ought to be exempt from harmless 
error analysis.s0 These commentators focused on 
the nature of the constitutional right violated 
rather than the nature of the process by which the 
harmlessness is determined?' For the most part 
they follow Justice Black's position and have con- 
centrated on constitutional error which affects the 
"process" of the trial, such as failure of counsel or 
discrimination in the selection of a jury panel, 
rather than on those errors which affect the amount 
of evidence presented. They have argued that when 
a violation of the right is either harmless by defi- 
nition-jury accesss2-or beyond precise determi- 
nation-effective assistance of counsels3-harmless 
78 Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Holloway u. A r k a m ,  
435 U.S. 475 (1978), rejects the contention that harmless 
error analysis is appropriate when a defendant raises a 
failure of effective assistance of counsel due to a conflict 
of interest. His rejection is based upon the proposition 
that "a rule requiring the defendant to show that a 
conflict of interests . . . prejudiced him . . . " would not 
be susceptible to evenhanded application as is required 
in harmless error analysis. There can be little doubt from 
his explanation that he considers the defendant to have 
the burden of demonstration with respect to harmless 
error. 
79 ~us t ice  Rehnquist's statement that "[iln this case, 
we conclude that the 'minds of an average jury' would 
not have found the State's case significantly less persua- 
sive had the testimony as to Snell's admission been 
excluded," can only be read in the context of his opinion 
to mean that the jury verdict would not have been 
different. 405 U.S. at 432. The effect is to make the 
harmless constitutional error test the equivalent of a 
guilty or not guilty determination, allowing only those 
who can demonstrate to the appellate court that they are 
not guilty as a matter of law-that is, can demonstrate a 
reasonable doubt as to the entire case-to gain a new 
trial when constitutional rights are abridged. 
See, e.g., Mause, supra note 4. 
81 See, e.g., Note, Harmless Constitufional Error, 20 STAN. 
L. REV. 83 (1967). 
Field, supra note 4, at 19-20. 
" Mause, supra note 4, at  541. 
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constitutional error analysis is inappropriate. None 
has suggested that the harmless constitutional error 
process itself violates the defendant's right to a trial 
by 
When a n  appellate court tests for harmlessness 
by reviewing the record to determine whether the 
remainder of the evidence is so overwhelming that 
the error did not contribute to the verdict, it sits as 
a n  appellate jury.85 T h e  test assumes that the error 
made a difference in the amount of evidence pre- 
sented to  the When the appellate court 
Professor Saltzburg has suggested that the Chapman 
rule is required for all error in a criminal case-be it 
constitutional or common-by virtue of the due process 
clause and the right to trial by jury. Saltzburg, supra note 
4, at 991-93. Professor Mause briefly raised the possibility 
that the jury trial guarantee made any harmless consti- 
tutional error rule unconstitutional, but rejected the 
proposition because nothing requires a state to provide 
appellate review of any kind in a criminal case. Mause, 
supra note 4, at 531-32. Professor Saltzburg raised the 
same problem for his proposition that the jury trial right 
precluded any test but Chapman's reasonable doubt test 
for all error in criminal trials. Saltzburg, supra note 4, at 
1028. Saltzburg was probably correct with respect to 
common error. Mause was undoubtedly wrong with re- 
spect to constitutional error. States cannot avoid federal 
review, upon habeas corpus, for error of a constitutional 
nature. It follows that any jury trial problem resulting 
from application of a harmless error rule cannot be set 
aside for constitutional error, although it may be for 
common error. 
Professor Field, supra note 4, at 39, suggests that the 
Hamigfon test is not really "overwhelming evidence" but 
"cumulative evidence." Whatever merit there may be to 
the distinction, the appellate court must, in the first 
instance, make a judgment about the quantity or quality 
of the remainder of the evidence. Professor Saltzburg, 
supra note 4 at  10 14, n.89, argues that there is no practical 
difference between the effect of the evidence test and the 
overwhelming evidence test so long as the appellate court 
uses a "virtually certain" or beyond a reasonable doubt 
test on the remainder of the evidence. He maintains that 
in any instance where the overwhelming evidence test 
leaves the Court with the belief that the defendant is 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt it would also find that 
the error had made no contribution to the verdict. While 
that may often be the case, it is not necessarily so. For 
example, in Allison v. Gray, 603 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1979), 
the evidence would leave the average skeptic convinced 
of the defendant's guilt. However, the error was failure 
to allow the defendant to present alibi evidence. Under 
the effect of the error test, the exclusion of the defendant's 
evidence could never be harmless. Regardless of whether 
it would often lead to the same result, the appellate 
activity in the effect of the evidence test is a traditional 
appellate exercise of determining a factual "could" by 
assuming all facts in a light most favorable to the party 
without the appellate burden, while in the overwhelming 
evidence test the court is reaching an original fact judg- 
ment. 
Professor Field suggests that the overwhelming evi- 
decides that the evidence presented to  the jury 
minus (or plus) the evidence produced (or ex- 
cluded) by the error, it is the only factfinder which 
has ever made a guilty/not guilty judgment about 
the new amount of evidence. 
An appellate court's determination that a set of 
facts supports a guilty verdict, in the first instance, 
is unprecedented. T h e  failure of precedent reflects 
a consistent and long t e w  judgment about the 
wisdom and constitutionality of such a n  appellate 
determination. For reasons so familiar that Justice 
Brennan did not think repetition was necessary in 
Hammngton, appellate courts restrict their factfinding 
activity to the review of what a previous factfinder 
f0und.8~ T h e  review is limited to determinations 
that the factfinder's conclusion cannot be justified 
even when all of the evidence is viewed in a light 
most favorable to the c o n c l ~ s i o n . ~  
An appellate court defies common sense when it 
steps out of its traditional role as a reviewing court 
and attempts to operate as a primary factfinder. 
Appellate review of an entire trial transcript is a n  
incredibly inefficient use of appellate court time. 
To pursue such a course in order to  determine 
whether error is harmless, so that judicial economy 
might be served is not only ironic, it is nonsensi- 
~ a l . ~  In addition, unless the litigants are placed on 
dence test may be applicable to constitutional errors at 
trial which do not affect the amount of evidence pre- 
sented to the jury. Field, supra note 4, at 16. None of the 
Supreme Court decisions finding harmless constitutional 
error has involved an error which did not affect the 
amount of evidence. Those cases to reject harmless con- 
stitutional error treatment for particular error have in- 
volved errors which did not quantifiably affect the 
amount of evidence. While the necessary speculation 
involved with such analysis has never been assigned as a 
reason for excluding all such error from harmlessness 
analysis, it seems to be the rationale from case to case. 
See, e.g., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). 
87 395 U.S. at 257 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See discus- 
sion at text accompanying notes 91-98 infra, for the oft- 
cited factors militating against appellate factfinding. 
88 Justice Rehnquist misused the familiar sufficiency of 
the evidence test in Schneble v. Florida, 305 U.S. 427. 
He relied upon-Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 352 
U.S. 500 (1957);to support a factfinding presumption in 
favor of the government on an issue for which it had the 
burden of proof. 405 U.S. at 432. Justice Marshall, in 
dissent, wasted no time in pointing out that the appellate 
function in determining the sufficiency of the evidence in 
a civil case was exactly the opposite of the function set 
out by the harmless error test,~and employed a presump- 
tion exactly opposite of that underlying the reasonable 
. - 
doubt burden.-405 U.S. 433-34. 
89 Justice Stewart, concurring in Chapman, alludes to 
the difficulty of an appellate court reviewing each tran- 
script from case to case in order to determine harmless- 
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notice that the error is conceded and harmlessness 
is the only issue, the appellate court must review 
the entire transcript and make a determination 
without the benefit of the litigants' view of the 
facts-a substantial departure from the normal 
method of appellate review. To the extent that 
appellate time is saved by the litigants' shaping 
and narrowing the issues, the inability of the liti- 
gants to contribute to the.appellate decisionmaking 
process harms the litigants and wastes court time. 
Unless the courts adopt a policy of total fact review 
first and legal issue second,90 the appellate court 
cannot begin the time-consuming task of fact re- 
view until it has taken the time to perform its 
traditional function of reviewing for and, in this 
case, finding error'. From the perspective of efficient 
appellate practice only-judicial economy of a 
kind-the harmless constitutional error doctrine 
involves a tremendous increase in appellate court 
time and a diminution of the traditional assistance 
that counsel provides. 
From an institutional perspective, the time cost 
is not as substantial as the cost in justice. Appellate 
courts are, by their position as dispassionate and 
removed arbiters of the law, extremely poor finders 
of fact. Appellate courts' deference to trial court 
factfinding is not a matter of a~cident.~'  A cold 
record, assuming that it is accurate, cannot substi- 
tute for a trial. Every trial lawyer knows that the 
"facts" of demeanor are at least as important as 
the "facts" of testimony. An appellate court read- 
ing a record in its entirety92 knows nothing of the 
unreasonable pause, the inappropriate smile, the 
sarcasm that changes a "sure" which means "yes" 
ness, and then candidly admits that "[tlhis burdensome 
obligation is one that we here are hardly qualified to 
discharge." 386 U.S. at 45. 
In Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972), over 
the vigorous dissent of four justices, Chief Justice Burger 
stood appellate procedure on its head. He assumed the 
error-the real question in the case-and proceeded, so 
hesaid, to review the entire record to make a harmlessness 
determination. 
'I "Such deference is particularly apposite because the 
trial judge and jury are closest to the trial scene and thus 
are afforded the best opportunity to evaluate contradic- 
tory testimony." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 408 
(1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
There is no way to insure that judges read the entire 
transcript. Given the volume in most appellate courts, it 
stretches the imagination to believe that even one of the 
judges would read the entire record. In fact, most matters 
come to appellate courts with abbreviated records col- 
lected in an appendix by litigants to whom harmlessness 
has not occurred. The appendix and record are chosen 
for relevance to the legal issues raised. Good practice and 
appellate rules encourage the abbreviated record. 
to a "sure" which means "I don't believe that" or 
"I don't agree." Appropriately, every trial court 
instructs the jury that it is the sole judge of witness 
credibility. Rule 52's admonition that appellate 
courts in civil cases shall give "due regard . . . to 
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses"93 is no accident. One 
of the problems with appellate factfinding is that 
the appellate court is likely to be wrong. 
The greatest cost of the harmless constitutional 
errors rule is its usurpation of the jury function. 
Aside from the likelihood of erroneous factfinding 
because a cold record is a poor communicator, an 
appellate court is far removed from being a jury, 
and jury trials comprise the heart of our criminal 
justice system. We are probably better off with 
juries making "wrong" decisions than with judges 
making "right" ones?5 The decisionmaking gulf 
between three appellate judges reading a transcript 
at their leisure in chambers and twelve citizens 
locked in ajury room is not bridged by an appellate 
judge's intellectual understanding of the reasona- 
ble doubt standard., In comparing the appellate 
jury to the petit jury some questions should be 
asked. Which defendant, let alone the defendant's 
lawyer, would demand a jury trial and then allow 
an appellate judge to sit on the jury? Even with 
the limited voir dire available in most federal 
courts, if a lawyer were foolish enough to seat an 
appellate judge on a jury, would the lawyer do so 
93 FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). 
%Justice Harlan, in his Fahy dissent, points out that a 
nonconstitutional error can be as prejudicial to a defend- 
ant as a constitutional error, and in some instances, more 
so. 375 U.S. at  94. Professor Saltzburg, supra note 4, at 
989-90, makes the same point in arguing for the same 
harmless error rule in criminal cases involving constitu- 
tional and common error. While the automatic reversal 
rule for harmless constitutional error does not suffer from 
the same vulnerability to the "appellate review not re- 
quired" argument as does harmless common error, the 
potential for denial of a jury trial exists as strongly for 
common error as it does for constitutional error when the 
character ofjury justice (as opposed to appellate justice) 
is at issue. 
'' Justice Harlan, in a rare example of poor judgment, 
once suggested that "untrained jurors are presumably 
less adept at  reaching accurate conclusion of fact than 
judges.. . . " Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 188-89 
(1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Even if true, the value in 
citizen participation may outweigh the value of a deci- 
sionmaking system which makes more correct decisions. 
In the law generally, and in criminal law particularly, 
the societal acceptability of the decision may be more 
important than its correctness. Juries represent an insti- 
tutional insurance policy for the continued acceptability 
of the decisionmaking system. 
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without some voir dire? Would the lawyer at least 
find out who thejudge was before failing to exercise 
a p e r e m p t ~ r y ? ~ ~  Assuming a lawyer who would try 
a factual defense to a jury of appellate judges, 
would he agree to waive surnrna t i~n?~~ Would that 
lawyer allow the appellate jury to know that a 
previous jury found the defendant guilty? Would 
the lawyer agree that group decisionmaking means 
nothing and that the jury members could go back 
to their ofices and.read through notes at their own 
pace until they reach a decision? Would the lawyer 
agree that jury nullification was of no particular 
value to the defendant?98 Any lawyer who might 
agree to all of the above would not have much 
quarrel with a three-person jury finding the de- 
fendant guilty, two-to-one. 
Duncan v. Loui~iana,~~ decided a year after Chap- 
man, held that the right to a trial by jury was one 
of those fundamental rights which not even the 
existence of state boundaries could destroy. Pre- 
sumably it would be one of those rights "so basic 
to a fair trial"lm that even Justice Black would 
consider harmless error analysis to be inappro- 
priate. In deciding that a trial judge's decision that 
Gary Duncan was guilty of simple battery beyond 
a reasonable doubt could not be squared with the 
sixth amendment right to ajury trial, Justice White 
reviewed the history of American juries. He as- 
signed "oppression by the Government" and "pro- 
tect[ion] . . . against judges" as two of the major 
reasons for the insistence upon the right to jury 
96A danger exists that when harmlessness is at  issue 
the appellate lawyer who decides to argue harm is making 
his pitch to the jury's "boss," not the jury. If long 
transcripts are to be read, clerks are likely to do the 
reading, not judges. 
97 Because harmlessness is rarely at issue in briefs or at  
argument, the defense lawyer never gets to argue the 
facts and the law to the appellate jury. Even if the 
opportunity is there, the judges have not yet read the 
record, and the lawyer is arguing from factual thin air. 
Additionally, in criminal cases much of the argument for 
the defendant is related to the burden of proof. There is 
no opportunity to make that argument, and there is some 
reason to believe that appellate judges are in more need 
of the refresher than some juries. See, c.g., Milton v. 
Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972). 
98J~ ry  nullification is not a particularly common 
event, and may not often be affected by an evidence 
error. However, there may, be circumstances in which a 
jury failed to exercise its power to nullify the law because 
the error admitted evidence that dissuaded it from nul- 
lification, or excluded evidence which, if heard, would 
have persuaded the jury to nullify. 
99 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
I" ~us t ice  Black's description of those errors which the 
Court had found to require automatic reversal. 386 U.S. 
at 23. 
trial in criminal cases.101 
After Duncan, the Court spent some time deciding 
exactly how many people were needed for a jury, 
what constituted an impartial jury,lo2 and how 
many of those impartial jurors had to agree before 
a criminal verdict was proper. While there was 
substantial disagreement, no Justice on the Court 
ever suggested that three is enough to make a jury, 
that less than six votes is enough to convict, or that 
appellate judges are diverse enough to constitute a 
community cross section. Although Williams v. Flor- 
idalo3 held that the jury guaranteed by Duncan need 
not be made up of twelve persons, and Apodaca v. 
0regonlo4 allowed that a criminal jury need not be 
unanimous, Burch v. Louisianalo5 made it clear that 
the sixth amendment required a jury as small as 
six persons to be unanimous before it could return 
a guilty verdict.lo6 Furthermore, Taylor v. Louis- 
ianalo7 and Duren v. ~ i s s o u r i ' ~ ~  established that the 
defendant's sixth amendment right to an impartial 
jury meant that the jury must be drawn from a 
fair cross section of the community. An appellate 
court of three, deciding guilt by a vote of two-to- 
one is hardly a jury. 
The effect of the decisions in Ham'ngton and 
Schnebte, and their approval of the overwhelming 
evidence approach to harmless constitutional error 
is to deny the defendant/appellant a right to a 
trial by jury. The appellate court, by definition, 
sits as a jury and makes a guilt determination 
based upon an amount of evidence upon which no 
jury has passed. While double jeopardy in the 
classic sense is not involved, a certain discomfiture 
lies in an appellate court's determination that a 
lower appellate court erred in its judgment that an 
error was not harmless.10g Lastly, there is, at a 
minimum, some embarrassment in a decision 
lo' 391 U.S. at 155-56. 
lo2 The sixth amendment guarantees, among other 
things: " . . . trial, by an impartial jury." U.S. CONST. 
amend. VI. 
lW 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (approving a jury of six). 
'04 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (approving a guilty verdict by 
ten-to-two jury votes). 
'05 441 U.S. 130 (1979). 
lo6 Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), somehow 
discerned a constitutional difference between six and five, 
allowing a jury of six, but not of five. 
'07 419 U.S 522 (1975). 
'08 439 U.S. 357 (1979). 
lmThe dissent in Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. at 
378, pointed out that no less than four other courts had 
considered the matter and none had found the error to 
be harmless. If each used the "overwhelming" evidence 
test, only the Supreme Court-five-to-four-believed 
that the untainted evidence proved guilt beyond a rea- 
sonable doubt. 
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which says that an error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt: five-to-four. 
IV. SECOND STORY JOB ON THE CONSTITUTION 
The harmless constitutional error doctrine works 
only a petty theft on individual defendants' rights 
in specific cases but its consistent application exerts 
a more profound effect upon society. The harmless 
constitutional error rule, regardless of the test, mil- 
itates against basic freedoms and controls upon 
governmental institutions that operate against in- 
dividuals. At all levels of the criminal justice sys- 
tem, the harmless constitutional error rule dilutes 
the impact of most constitutional criminal proce- 
dure decisions of the last quarter century which 
preserve individual rights against contrary claims 
of necessity by the government. The rule allows an 
ad hoc, after the fact, factual judgment by an 
appellate court which makes it difficult for an 
individual to attack it and diminishes the level of 
protection provided by specific constitutional pro- 
visions without affording any opportunity to argue 
the issue's merits. If, as some claim, many of the 
Warren Court decisions of the 1960s were ill-ad- 
vised, if the society has, indeed, been damaged by 
the change in the relationship between the individ- 
ual and the state as incarcerator, that is a matter 
to be addressed on the merits, not through the 
procedural backdoor of harmless constitutional er- 
ror. 
Harmless constitutional error is particularly in- 
appropriate because of the special relationship be- 
tween the Constitution and the courts. All of the 
assumptions necessary to support any harmless 
error doctrine are inapplicable when the error at 
stake abrogates a constitutional right. Any doctrine 
which allows an appellate court to identify an error 
and then find it "harmless" assumes that the ap- 
pellate function is limited to the correction of an 
inappropriate trial court result. Further, it assumes 
the decision will affect the litigants alone."0 The 
harmless error doctrine assumes that any other 
interest, other than the correction of an inappro- 
priate trial result, is sufficiently insignificant to 
balance unfavorably against the nonconstitutional 
value of judicial e~onorn~.~ ' '  
"O While the result might affect future and unknown 
litigants, it is the litigants in the case or those that may 
someday be similarly placed that are affected, to the 
exclusion of the public in general. 
111 A public interest exists for every law, including the 
Missouri constitutional requirement which caused the 
reversal of Campbell's case for want of a "the" in the 
indictment. State v. Campbell, 210 Mo. 202, 109 S.W. 
At least since Marbury v.   ad is on,"^ the Supreme 
Court obligation of judicial review has been the 
lifeblood of the living Constitution. Justice Har- 
lan's Chapman dissent decries what he sees as the 
Court's "assumption of what amounts to a general 
supervisory power over the trial of federal consti- 
tutional issues in state  court^,""^ but he is a lone 
voice. Justice Black left little doubt that federalism 
concerns are insufficient tojustify state interference 
with rights emanating from the federal Constitu- 
t i ~ n . " ~  
The special relationship between the Constitu- 
tion and the Court, in which each gains its strength 
from the other, is unique when the rights in ques- 
tion are those enumerated in the first eight amend- 
ments. One does not have to accept Justice Black's 
theory of total incorporationn5 to recognize that 
the first eight amendments are antimajoritarian 
and antigovernment. In the American system, the 
courts historically have been the only institution 
sufficiently separated from the political system to 
act as the preserver of those antimajoritarian and 
antigovernmental rights. The cost of that preser- 
vation has never been small: "The criminal is to 
go free because the constable has bl~ndered."''~ 
If certain errors are to be susceptible to harmless 
error treatment and others are not,"? the Consti- 
706 (1908). The harmless error rule assumes that what- 
ever that interest may be it is of less weight than the 
interest in judicial economy. 
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
386 U.S. at 46-47 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
See note 37 supra 
~us t ice  Black argued that the first eight amend- 
ments were totally incorporated into the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment and were thereby 
applicable to the states. His position, most fully set out in 
his dissent in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 
(1947) (Black, J., dissenting), never held a majority of the 
Court. Ironically, his position was set out in opposition 
to the due process approach of Cardozo, Frankfurter, 
Harlan and others, which inquired as to whether the 
matter a t  issue was fundamental to the American concept 
of criminal justice. His language in Chapman, "so basic to 
a fair trial," comes perilously close to the Cardozo-Frank- 
furter-Harlan concept of distinguishing between rights 
based upon "fundamentalism." 
116 People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 
587 (1926) (opinion of Cardozo, J.). 
Justice Black, by his Chapmon acknowledgment of 
the Court's prior decisions, Justice Stewart, by his desire 
to exclude the fourth amendment, and the many com- 
mentators by their various selections have all agreed that 
there are some constitutional errors which ought to be 
subject to the harmless error approach and others which 
should not. None has presented a particularly persuasive 
reason for discrimination between constitutional errors. 
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tution is the only reasonable place to draw the which society has little, if any, interest outside of 
line."' The efficacy of that line is based upon the the conduct of the trial.'" Constitutional rights 
assumptions of both the harmless error doctrine 
and the system of constitutional jurisprudence. 
There are three major differences between noncon- 
stitutional and constitutional rights which demand 
distinction between them when the appropriate- 
ness of harmless error analysis is at issue. 
First, nonconstitutional rights, the abrogation of 
which create trial error, are transitory and political. 
They are legislatively created, maintained, 'and 
changed. Their preservation is ensured by the ul- 
timate safeguard of majority approval, or at least 
political process approval. Constitutional rights, on 
the other hand, are immune to the political process, 
at least as to preservation.11g Legislators and elec- 
torates have no function in the preservation of 
constitutional antimajoritarian and antigovern- 
mental individual rights. The courts, rightly or 
wrongly, are the sole institution for maintenance 
and change.l2' 
Second, nonconstitutional rights likely to be im- 
plicated in trial error are, generally, of a kind for 
- 
often implicate substantial societal interests exclu- 
sive of the error in a particular trial. In those cases 
where the defendant stands as society's surrogate- 
search cases, for instance-society's interest in the 
right has nothing to do with the trial result. The 
society's interest in the right is furthered, or not, 
by the result of the suppression hearing.'22 
Finally, nonconstitutional rights which are ab- 
rogated by trial error are usually neutral. They are 
as likely to benefit the government in a given trial 
as they are the defendant. Hearsay, for example, 
may benefit the government in one instance and 
the defendant in another. Constitutional rights, 
such as the right to confrontation, which might be 
abrogated by a trial error, are always beneficial to 
the defendant and consistently restrictive with re- 
spect to the government's case. Each of these three 
differences has institutional consequences which 
differentiate common error from constitutional er- 
ror when the appropriateness of a harmless error 
doctrine is the issue. The harmless constitutional 
~ustice Harlan compellingly argues that the Chap- 
man decision, to the extent it conceives "of an application 
of harmless-error rules as a remedy designed to safeguard 
particular constitutional rights," 386 U.S. at 50 (footnote 
omitted) (emphasis added), is unsupportable. As a device 
to insulate only some constitutional rights from applica- 
tion of state harmless error rules, a federal harmless error 
rule has little to recommend it. Neither Black nor Stewart 
suggests a rationale for the application of the stricter test 
to some constitutional rights. Once the judgment is made 
that all constitutional rights are beyond harmless consid- 
eration, Harlan's complaint about a failure of reason is 
gone. Perhaps he would disagree with a result which put 
a11 constitutional error beyond the reach of harmless 
error, however, clearly he agrees with the proposition 
that the nature of the Court's relationship to the Consti- 
tution makes the question of the validity of a harmless 
error rule a federal constitutional question unaffected by 
the nature of the specific constitutional right. 
Concededly, constitutional rights are subject to the 
political process through the power of amendment, but 
the political activity relates to repeal and addition rather 
than preservation. The political process possibly could 
destroy a constitutional right such as the fourth amend- 
ment, but the political process of constitutional amend- 
ment probably could not preserve the right. 
'''In the fourth amendment context, a number of 
commentators have suggested that the executive might 
protect and preserve the privacy of citizens more effec- 
tively than the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Kaplan, The 
Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027 
(1974). While there might be a chance, it is a little like 
putting the foxes in charge of the chicken coop. It in- 
dulges the assumption that there is no need for the 
antigovernment provision in the first instance. 
error doctrine has interfered with the Supreme 
Court's task of interpreting the Constitution, and 
may have, in one instance, changed other interpre- 
tations without notice. 
Hammngton and Schneble were both "confronta- 
tion" cases and represent a line of cases which 
demonstrates two ways in which the harmless con- 
stitutional error doctrine interferes with the orderly 
development of constitutional law. Bmton v. united 
States,'23 decided one year after Chapman and before 
Ham'ngton, overruled Delli Paoli v. United States.'" 
Delli ~ a o l i  allowed the confession of a codefendant 
in a joint trial to be offered despite the fact that 
the individual did not testify. The Court held an 
instruction to the iurv that the confession could be " .  
considered only against the confessing codefendant 
sufficiently protected the other defendant's right to 
confrontation. The Bmton Court, speaking through 
Justice Brennan, held that the instruction to dis- 
regard would not suffice in protecting the other 
I21 Obviously, some state rules affect conduct outside 
the scope of the trial, for example, a requirement that a 
confession be signed. Most nonconstitutional trial errors, 
however, will involve rules designed for the conduct of 
trials. 
'=This is not intended to imply that society has no 
interest in the trial result, but only that it has a distinct 
interest in the fourth amendment protection. It is that 
distinct interest which is not within the assumptions 
underlying the harmless error rule. 
I" 391 U.S. 123 (1968). 
352 U.S. 232 (1957). 
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defendant's right to confrontation. In reaching that 
conclusion, ~ i e n n a n  made an observation which, 
though true, was ignored the next year in Harring- 
ton: "We, of course, acknowledge the impossibility 
of determining whether in fact the jury did or did 
not ignore [the] statement inculpating petitioner in 
determining petitioner's Although both 
Douglas' majority opinion and Brennan's dissent 
in Harrington concentrated on the effect of the 
decision on Chapman, Hanington changed what ap- 
peared to be the basis for Bruton: The court can 
never be sure of the jury's response to a codefen- 
dant's confession, and, therefore, it will take no 
chances that the defendant's confrontation right 
might be abridged. While Hanington did not over- 
rule Bruton, it certainly did for all "good" govern- 
ment cases. Hanington's reliance upon "ovenvhelm- 
ing evidence" can only mean that the Bruton con- 
frontation right is unnecessary for the apparently 
guilty. In Harrington's situation, a statement 
which could be construed to implicate was held to 
fall short of a confessi~n.'~~ 
In Schneble, the petitioner's "confession"'27 was 
more inculpatory than Harrington's, though there 
was some question about its reliability.12' Justice 
Marshall, in dissent, attempted to show that Schne- 
ble's reliance upon Harrington was misplaced be- 
cause Harrington involved a codefendant's confes- 
sion which was "merely cumulative" of the defend- 
ant's "confession" to having been at the scene of 
the crime. However unpersuasive that distinction 
might have been, Justice Marshall said propheti- 
cally what might just as well have been said in 
lZ5 391 U.S. at 136. 
126 Significantly, the majority did not consider Hnrrin8- 
Ion to be a case of interlocking confessions. The statement 
by Harrington was a piece of circumstantial evidence no 
different from that provided by a witness who could 
testify that Harrington was around, but who could not 
testify to any criminal activity. 
127 Much of the confusion in Schneble arises from the 
varying views amongst the members of the Court as to 
the legality of the confession. Despite the limitation of 
the grant of certiorari to the "confrontation" question, 
the "confession" split on the Court has an obvious effect 
on the opinions. 
128Schneble's first "confession" was not reliable. His 
second "confession" was. The second confession occurred 
after what the dissent characterized as "a series of bizarre 
acts by the police." 405 U.S. at 434 (Marshall, J., dis- 
senting). The Florida Court found the second confession 
was sufficiently "attenuated" to allow its presentation to 
the jury. The jury's handling of the confession, and 
determination of whether it was voluntary, was part of 
the disagreement between the majority and the dissent 
as to the harmlessness of the offer of the codefendant's 
statement. 
Harrington: "Unless the Court intends to emasculate 
Bruton, supra, or to overrule Chapman v. California, 
supra, sub silentio, then I submit that its decision is 
clearly wrong."'29 
Which of the precedents, Bruton or Chapman, was 
the target in Schneble became clear in Parker v. 
Ra~dolph.'~' Justice Rehnquist, the author of Schne- 
ble, writing for a plurality in Parker, resurrected 
Delli Paoli and limited Bruton to those cases in which 
the implicated defendant "made no extrajudicial 
admission of The Parker plurality opinion, 
on confrontation grounds, was inconsistent with 
Bruton, relying instead on the two harmless consti- 
tutional error cases, Harrington and Schneble. Parker 
did to Bruton what Marshall suggested that Schneble 
did to Bruton, assuming Schneble to be a confronta- 
tion, not a harmless error, case. Justices Stevens, 
Brennan, and Marshall found Rehnquist's con- 
frontation position untenable. Justice Powell took 
no part in the decision. Justice Blackmun specifi- 
cally rejected Justice Rehnquist's position on Bruton 
but voted with him because he believed that the 
error was "harmless." 
Justice Blackmun's use of harmless constitu- 
tional error in Parker is a classic example of an 
appellate procedural doctrine blocking the resolu- 
tion of an important constitutional question. Had 
harmless constitutional error not been available to 
Justice Blackmun, he probably would have joined 
Justice Rehnquist on the merits, providing a ma- 
jority for the Rehnquist position. While he rejected 
Rehnquist's Bruton position to make his harmless 
error point,'32 his harmless error reasoning is diffi- 
cult to distinguish from Rehnquist's Bruton posi- 
tion. While one might have substantial disagree- 
ment with Rehnquist's Parker position, a constitu- 
tional position ought not fail of a majority for a 
harmless error doctrine. 
Ironically, harmless error is based on a concern 
for judicial economy. Had Blackmun prevailed, 
still another hearing and another round of appeals 
would have resulted, all in the interest of judicial 
133 economy. The right of confrontation is a consti- 
Id. at  437 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
I3O 442 U.S. 62 (1979). 
131 Id. at 74. 
132 Id. at 77 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part). 
13' Justice Blackmun, concurring in Moore v. Illinois, 
434 U.S. 220, 233 (1977), begins to hint at a cure worse 
than the disease for the extra round of hearings. He 
considered the victim's in-court identification of her 
assailant and said: "[Tlhe conclusion that it was harmless 
seems to me to be almost inevitable." Id. at 234. While 
he went on to say that it was for the lower court's 
determination in the first instance, his apparent willing- 
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tutional right. It runs consistently against the gov- 
ernment and in favor of the defendant. It depends 
upon the courts for its definition. Because the 
harmless constitutional error doctrine exists, and 
was able to draw the vote of a Supreme Court 
Justice, the status of the right and the case, Bmton, 
which defined it is still in doubt. If Bmton does not 
state the law of confrontation, and arguably it does 
not, ajudicial economy doctrine that does not work 
ought not deny us the knowledge. 
When a Supreme Court Justice can frustrate the 
constitutional proceh by refusing to decide a mat- 
ter on the merits in favor of a procedural doctrine 
invented to avoid retrials over omitted "the's," the 
loss is exceeded only by the danger of that same 
doctrine changing the constitutional process with- 
out warning. The plurality in Parker was not doing 
anything that the majority in Hamngton and Schne- 
ble had not done under the guise of "harmless" 
error. The difference is that Hamngton and Schneble 
gave poor notice that the Bmton doctrine would not 
apply to cases in which there was an extrajudicial 
statement from the defendant complaining of the 
confrontation failure. The harmless constitutional 
error doctrine is a particularly evil erosive mecha- 
nism. Assuming for a moment that methods to 
erode constitutional doctrines without destroying 
them are useful tools in the law, harmless error 
analysis is not one of those useful tools. Harmless 
error analysis does not address, nor give the oppor- 
tunity to address, the merits of the doctrine being 
eroded. The case for gradual change in constitu- 
tional propositions by erosion is not made by resort 
to a doctrine that gives proponents and opponents 
of the constitutional proposition no opportunity to 
speak to the merits and courts no opportunity to 
signal where they are going. 
Milton v. Wainwright'34 is an example of the evil 
effect of the harmless constitutional error doctrine 
when five Justices are willing to avoid the issue as 
Justice Blackrnun did in Parker. George Milton was 
indicted for murder, had a lawyer, and was in jail 
awaiting trial. He had made some statements that 
were less than fully re1iab1e.l~~ The police were 
ness to reach the conclusion quickly, coupled with Chief 
Justice Burger's procedure in Milton v. Wainwright, 407 
U.S. 371, to consider harmlessness as a new matter in the 
Supreme Court, suggests the possibility of an increase in 
harmlessness decisions from the Supreme Court as a 
method to decide each case on its narrowest ground. 
407 U.S. 371 (1972). 
'35 Chief Justice Burger's opinion does not mention 
that the "overwhelming" evidence was a set of "confes- 
sions" taken over an eighteen-day period, during which 
sufficiently concerned that they sent an officer into 
Milton's cell, posing as a prisoner. During the two 
days that Milton and the policeman, Langford, 
"roomed" together, Milton made damaging state- 
ments to the policeman which ~an~ford-related to 
thejury at trial. The District Court viewed Milton's 
habeas complaint about the statements as raising 
the issue presented in Massiah v. united ~ ta tes , '~~  but 
denied Milton any relief because Massiah had never 
been held to be retroactive. 
Chief Justice Burger, speaking for five members 
of the Court in Milton, did not address the Massiah 
issue.137 He assumed arguendo that there was error, 
and wrote an eight-page opinion explaining why 
the hypothetical error was harmless. Justice Stew- 
art, the author of Massiah, speaking for four mem- 
bers of the Court, took vigorous exception to the 
lower court's view of Massiah, the majority's failure 
to consider Powell v. ~labarna, '~~ and the Court's 
conclusion that the error-whatever it was-was 
harmless. One hardly needs to take sides on the 
merits of the Massiah retroactivity issue to demon- 
strate that the harmless error doctrine is an abom- 
ination when constitutional matters are at stake in 
the Supreme Court. The retroactivity of Massiah 
remains unanswered and the continued strength of 
Powell is now in doubt because five out of nine 
members of the Court were able to classify an 
unidentified error as harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Laying aside the value of five out of nine 
persons finding anything true beyond a reasonable 
the defendant was held incommunicado and questioned 
almost every day, often for hours at  a time. He denied 
his guilt for the first ten days. Set 407 U.S. at 383. Chief 
Justice Burger gave no consideration to the possibility 
that the jury may well have been unwilling to convict 
based upon the suspicious confessions, and gave them 
great weight only in view of the ''harmless error"-the 
"voluntary" conversation with the cellmate. 
'36 377 U.S. 201 (1964). United States v. Henry, 100 S. 
Ct. 2183 (1980), decided eight years after Milton, pre- 
sented almost exactly the same Massid-relevant facts. 
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion in Henry detailed 
an understanding of Massid with which four Justices 
took issue on one basis or another. Nothing in the Chief 
Justice's opinion justifies, explains, or even mentions the 
eight years in which the Court left everybody else up in 
the air as to the meaning of Massid. 
13' ~us t ice  Stewart, the author of Marsid, described it 
as a "counsel" case in Milton, while the-district and circuit 
courts read it to be about "voluntariness." 407 U.S. at 
380 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The Chief Justice's excursion 
into harmless constitutional error as a matter of first 
instance in the Supreme Court left the disagreement, 
alon with the retroactivity question, unresolved. 
'287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
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doubt, substantial questions remain unanswered law, there is not likely to be a dissent on the facts- 
and new ones are raised unnecessarily. In  addition, even if a judge might have some question about 
the Supreme Court spends its valuable time mak- the facts.14' 
ing a factual judgment about a long record rather If a state or  federal appellate court chooses to 
than examining the law of the case, or, a t  least, the use the harmless constitutional error as a tool to 
law of some other case. The  doctrine of harmless 
error damages the Constitution by failing to ad- 
dress important issues as in Milton. It also causes a 
misallocation of court time which could be better 
spent performing tasks other than reading a long 
record. T h e  harmless constitutional error doctrine 
in the Supreme Court is a n  unwarranted and 
dysfunctional impediment to the constitutional 
process. 
T h e  constitutional damage from the harmless 
constitutional error doctrine is not limited to the 
Supreme Court and its use of the doctrine to avoid 
constitutional judgments as in Parker, or to make 
constitutional judgments without real notice as in 
emasculate a constitutional right through a con- 
sistent finding of harmlessness in a series of cases, 
it is likely to succeed without question. Although 
prosecutors who handle cases within a jurisdiction 
may watch closely to see which area of error is 
becoming "harrnles~,"'~~ commentators, the people 
most likely to be concerned with a pattern of 
dilution, are unlikely to be alerted, given the lgck 
of legal mistake with which to quarrel. A given 
defendant may press through the habeas corpus 
maze to appeal a state determination of harmless- 
ness or  appeal to the Supreme Court from a circuit 
court harmlessness decision, but the likelihood of a 
successful appeal of a harmlessness affirmance is 
Schneble. Appellate courts, both state and federal, slim. Given the number of harmless constitutional 
have occasionally been less than enthusiastic about error decisions, and the difficulty in finding rever- 
certain constitutional decisions of the United States sals of those decisions by a higher appellate court, 
Supreme Court. Harmless constitutional error pro- the potential of the harmless constitutional error 
vides such courts a n  opportunity to "destroy or doctrine for unmaking law has not gone unnoticed 
dilute constitutional guarantees."'39 The  doctrine by appellate t r i b ~ n a 1 s . l ~ ~  While there may be some 
is unmatched as a tool for the secret theft of other explanation for the marked increase in the 
constitutional rights. A finding that a constitu- use of harmless constitutional error, avoidance of 
tional error is harmless is almost beyond question 
or review. While there are some fact circumstances 
and trial situations so obvious that it is incredible 
that any appellate judge would make a harmless 
error finding,l4' most such findings are based upon 
long and relatively inaccessible records. Further, 
the majority opinion will generally reflect those 
portions of the record which.support the "harm- 
less" determination. If there is no dissent on the 
Justice Harlan's Chapman dissent recognized the 
danger and reserved the eventuality of state court dilu- 
tion of federal constitutional rights as a basis for his 
concurrence with a decision which would prohibit the 
activity by imposition of a federal standard. 386 U.S. at 
50. 
140 A rare example of a harmless constitutional error 
decision which is so preposterous on its face that no 
particular resort to a record is required is found in Allison 
v. Gray, 603 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1979). The error was a 
failure to allow the defendant to present his alibi evi- 
dence. The Wisconsin Supreme Court and the federal 
district court apparently believed that the government's 
case was so overwhelming that there was no need for a 
jury to listen to and believe the defendant's case. Short of 
this kind of a case, in which the court finds the failure of 
the government to allow a trial to be harmless, harmless- 
ness is not easily seen by the reviewer without benefit of 
a full record. 
141 Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, exemplifies 
the situation where there is a quarrel about the factual 
finding of harmlessness which would not likely have 
occurred but for the legal dispute. Even in Harrinzton and 
Schneble, the dispute on the facts is only in furtherance of 
the complaint about the test the Court is adopting. 
14' The problem of prosecutorial deterrence is consid- 
ered at text accompanying notes 154-159 in& Justice 
Cameron of the Arizona Supreme Court has observed 
that the result of consistent signals to prosecutors is 
prosecutorial reception of the signals: "[Ilf a particular 
error is declared to be harmless a sufficient number of 
times, then the cumulative effect of such holdings will be 
that both the prosecution and the trial judge will tend to 
ignore the error and commit it again." Cameron & Duke, 
When Harmless Error Isn't Harmless, 1971 LAW & SOC. ORD. 
23,42. 
'"Whether the absence.or presence of second level 
reversals of harmless determinations would be the more 
unhappy circumstance is unclear. Given the large num- 
ber of harmless cases, it seems fair to conclude that the 
small number of second level reversals is directly related 
to the difficulty of review of a factual judgment. On the 
other hand, a significant number of second level reversals 
on harmless error would be sorry proof that lower appel- 
late courts were, indeed, hiding behind harmless error as 
a means to dilute constitutional rights. The other possi- 
bility, that there is an incredible increase in the number 
of trial mistakes that do not matter in fact, has little to 
support it in logic or evidence. 
Heinonline - -  71 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 436 1980 
19801 HARMLESS ERROR: CONSTITUTIONAL SNEAK THIEF 437 
constitutional responsibility is not without prece- 
dent.'44 
Harmless constitutional error presents special 
problems for trial courts and prosecutors that are 
not a concern when the harmless error is "com- 
mon." Because harmless constitutional error always 
operates in favor of the government and against 
the defendant, the doctrine puts unique pressure 
on a conscientious trial judge or prosecutor to 
ignore a citizen's acknowledged constitutional 
rights based upon the "no harm-no foul" the- 
~ r y . ' ~ ~  
Trial courts make the first, and often most influ- 
ential,'46 decision concerning the constitutional 
rights of the defendant. I t  is the trial court, and 
particularly the state trial court'47 where the cost 
Justice Powell, concurring in Argersinger v. Ham- 
lin, 407 U.S. 25,65 (1972), had no hesitancy in ascribing 
"the failure of many state courts to live up to their 
responsibilities in determining on a case-by-we basis 
whether counsel should be appointed" as a motive behind 
the landmark decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
- - 
335 (1963). 
1 4 ~  Althoueh demonstrating the effect of anv decision- - .2 
maker's benim neglect is difficult, the art form from 
which the ph;ase H taken, professional basketball, pre- 
sents an interesting analogy. Before the "no harm-no 
foul" type interpretations of the rules by modern referees, 
basketball was considered a kind of sporting dance in- 
appropriate (in those days) for "men." Anyone watching 
the modem no harm-no foul game can attest that a 
portion of that contact sport resembles a war zone. It is 
difficult for one trained in the law to assume that prose- 
cutors and judges would not be at least as quick as 
basketball centers and referees to adjust to this kind of 
development. 
14' The first judgment is the standard against which 
other possibilities are considered. The trial court's judg- 
ment about both the facts and the law often influences 
decisions three or four appellate layers later. See, e.g., 
Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1690 n.9 (1980) 
(quoting trial judge), where the trial judge's statement 
that it was "entirely understandable that [the officers in 
the police vehicle] would voice their concern" made it all 
the way to a United States Supreme Court opinion and 
served as a part of the foundation for the proposition that 
there was no "interrogation." See ako Note, F$h Ammd- 
ment-The Meaning of Interrogation Under Miranda, 71 J. 
CRIM. L. & C. 466 (1980). 
'47Just~ce Harlan consistently maintained -that the 
circumstances of the states were very different from the 
circumstances of the federal government. His argument 
in Chapman, that federalism should be the first constitu- 
tional principle, persuaded no one on the Court. Regard- 
less of the impotence of the argument for law, the fact is 
that there is a huge difference between the circumstances 
and relationships of a federal trial court and a state trial 
court. The discussion which follows assumes a trial in a 
state trial court, the forum in which the vast majority of 
criminal litigation takes place. 
of the exclusion of evidence, for instance, is most 
immediately appreciated. Justice Frankfurter's ad- 
monition that "the safeguards of liberty have fre- 
quently been forged in controversies involving not 
very nice people,"'* is rarely lost on a trial judge, 
who is usually looking over the bench a t  the "not 
very nice" person. Unfortunately, there is no 
method for documenting the effect of the harmless 
constituticinal error doctrine on trial courts. Aside 
from the fact that most trial court opinions go 
unpublished, the issue of "harmlessness" is never 
officially raised a t  the initial confrontation over the 
loss of a constitutional guarantee. 
Some observations about the operation of trial 
courts and their place in the community might 
help fill the void left by the failure of formal 
opinions. Acknowledging the danger in anecdotal 
proof, I doubt that I a m  the only lawyer in the 
land who, when citing a precedent for error, has 
had the trial court review the precedent and say: 
"Counsel, I agree that the court held that to be 
error. But they said that it was harmless, and I 
think that this case is virtually the same as your 
precedent."'49 Predictably, the trial court focuses 
on the precedent's harmlessness determination 
rather than on the determination that there was 
indeed an error. 
Most constitutional matters arise in special pre- 
trial hearings under the glare of some publicity.'50 
Significantly, appellate courts decide such matters 
far away and after the heat is off. Trial judges live 
in, socialize with, and are, by design, subject to the 
influence of the community.'51 What ought such a 
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56,69 (1950) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting), ovmled, Chime1 v. Califor- 
nia, 395 U.S. 752 (1968). 
14' This composite response reflects some experience in 
response from trial judges commenting upon precedent 
which had good news and bad. The good news was the 
error, the bad news was that it was harmless. While a 
careful advocate would find precedents which showed 
only the error, the opportunity for that selection de- 
creased rapidly after Chapman as more and more cases 
found both error and harmlessness. 
16'Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), 
demonstrates that the pretrial hearing is often of as much 
public interest and concern as the trial. The trial court's 
decision to close the hearing may reflect something more 
than a concern for an impartial jury. The Supreme 
Court's willingness to allow the closure may evidence an 
unstated understanding of the pretrial pressures on judi- 
cial decisionmakers. See also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. 
v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980) (trial must be open to 
the press); Note, Constitutional Rkht of Access to Criminal 
T ~ a k ,  71 J. CRIM. L. & C. 547 (1980). 
151 Even in those "enlightened" jurisdictions which 
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judge do if a defendant charged with murder, and 
against whom there is overwhelming evidence of 
guilt, makes a motion to suppress evidence because 
of a violation of the Constitution? Justice Cardozo's 
rerninderl5' of the high price society pays for a 
decision to exclude evidence is best understood by 
a trial judge. T o  that problem for the trial court, 
add the proposition that appellate courts may find 
constitutional error to be "harmless" and that in a 
relatively similar case the highest court of the state 
has once done just that. T h e  trial court can read 
the highest court of the state to be holding that the 
error in question will always be h a r m 1 e ~ s . l ~ ~  It may 
read the court to be signaling a change in the law, 
and it may be correct. Last, and for constitutional 
protection, probably worst, the trial court may be 
correct in its view that the instant case and the 
precedent are factually so similar that the same 
harmless constitutional error determination would 
probably obtain upon review. The  result will be 
the same, regardless of which view the trial court 
takes. Either because the error is always harmless, 
or  the law is changing, or  because it can accurately 
predict that this particular error in this context will 
be harmless, the trial court will consciously commit 
constitutional error, safe in the "instruction" to do 
so from the state's highest court. The  result is a 
doctrine which, in the guise of judicial economy, 
almost requires the trial court to initially ignore 
the enforcement of constitutional rights. Signifi- 
cantly, the hypothesized activity does not depend 
have adopted plans for judicial selection other than the 
election contest, some form of community veto exists 
upon the performance of judicial trial function. Most 
jurisdictions maintain the election of trial judges, and 
while the upset of a sitting judge is rare, it does happen. 
More importantly, the trial judge, as opposed to the 
appellate judge, suffers or enjoys all of the personal 
concerns for acceptance within the community of which 
the judge is not only an integral, but an important and 
visible part. 
15'See note 116 & accompanying text supra. 
At least one court has determined that a constitu- 
tional error can never be harmful. In State ex rel. Mc- 
Mannis v. Mohn, 254 S.E.2d 805 (W. Va. 1979), the 
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that viola- 
tion of the principle in Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 
(1976) (defendants may not be forced to attend trial in 
prison garb), was harmless constitutional error when the 
defendant was on trial for a crime committed while in 
prison, and when the defense failed to raise its objection 
until after calling its first witness. Whether the decision 
might have been justifiable under a due process theory, 
or whether Estelle is distinguishable (the court's opinion) 
was beside the point. The West Virginia Court chose to 
create the anomaly that certain activity was always error 
and always harmless. 
upon any ulterior motive upon the part of the trial 
court. Quite the contrary is true. A respectable 
argument can be made that when a local trial 
judge is faced with the possibility of turning a 
"murderer" loose for the violation of a constitu- 
tional right which a n  appellate court has said in 
the same context led to a harmless constitutional 
error, the judge should err in favor of community 
safety. A "correct" result of guilty, given the cer- 
tainty, likelihood, or  possibility that the appellate 
court will say that the trial court's error was harm- 
less is more appropriate than any other result. It is 
also easier, and in this situation "easier" is not 
necessarily pejorative. 
T h e  result of the harmless constitutional error 
doctrine a t  the trial court level is to encourage the 
diminution of rights against the government for all 
individuals against whom the state has an over- 
whelming case.'" Harmless constitutional error 
., 
then becomes the presumption rather than the 
exception. T h e  fault is not with the trial court but 
with the concept that the abrogation of a consti- 
tutional right that runs consistently against the 
government can be harmless. 
As difficult as it is to isolate the effect of the 
harmless constitutional error on trial courts, it is 
even more obscure with prosecutors. There is, nev- 
ertheless, the nagging suspicion that the major 
denial of constitutional guarantees resulting from 
the harmless constitutional error doctrine relates to 
its effect upon prosecutors. Again, one need not 
posit the evil-minded prosecutor to demonstrate 
that harmless constitutional error steals significant 
rights by its effect upon the prosecuting authority. 
Prosecutors, as with all lawyers, are trained to 
represent their client to the limit of the law. The  
profession considers it unethical and unthinkable 
for the advocate to cross over the line, and mal- 
practice not to approach that line as closely as 
possible in pursuit of the client's just cause. The  
prosecutor's duty to " j~s t i ce , " '~~  may raise some 
'"The difference between the "effect of the evidence" 
test and the "overwhelming evidence" test may be of 
significance in this situation. At least with the former 
test, the trial court is not encouraged to prejudge the 
strength of the prosecution's case and make an error/no 
error decision based upon that judicial prejudgment of 
guilt. 
15' A sense of uneasiness pervades the common sugges- 
tion that prosecutor/advocates are somehow different 
from other advocates and can psychologically suffer pull- 
ing selected punches in the interest of justice. See, e.g., 
Standards Relating to the Prosecution and the D ~ e m c  Funcfion, 
ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION F 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 3-1.1 (approved draft, 1979) 
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doubt about how he should respond to a constitu- 
tional violation, but  the prosecutor's instincts as a 
lawyer combined with the harmless constitutional 
error doctrine, demand that the prosecutor abdi- 
cate any role as a positive force for the maintenance 
of constitutional g ~ a r a n t e e s . ' ~ ~  
When constitutional rights are a t  issue in the 
courts, prosecutors have a consistent position. 
Either as the result of the facts they are given or as 
a matter of government or  personal policy, the 
prosecutor is arguing in court that a n  alleged vi- 
temperament demand every available weapon, the 
doctrine presents a situation in which only the 
most foolish of prosecutors would avoid the risk of 
using the error. Every time a n  error is declared 
harmless in a particular situation, it diminishes the 
risk to  the prosecutor in the use of the evidence or 
the technique.15' T h e  lessening of the risk is added 
into a formula whith favors risk-taking based upon 
the doctrine alone. In  a sense, the doctrine encour- 
ages the prosecutor to use the evidence or the 
technique in every case. Initially, there are three 
olation of a constitutional right is not a violation, 
or  if it is, should not vitiate a good case.'57 T h e  '*Situations in which prosecutorial conduct may be influenced by "harmless" decisions are difficult to iden- 
same is not true when nonconstitutional tify. It may be reckless to ascribe motive from a consistent 
rules are at stake. T h e  result is that the prosecutor link of but a series of decisions in the Minnesota 
contributes to the erosion of doctrines in the courts Sdpreme Court leaves the distinct impression that pros- 
by maintaining a consistent position with respect 
to the harmlessness of constitutional error. T o  the 
extent that any litigant can find the opportunity 
or  mechanism to  argue harmlessness to the appel- 
late tribunal, it is the prosecutor. Furthermore, 
since the prosecutor is a consistent litigant against 
opponents with one-case or  one-issue interests, the 
prosecutor can, over a series of cases, maintain a 
position which is beyond the power of any single 
opponent to effectively confront. 
T h e  harmless constitutional error doctrine even 
affects the prosecutor in the investigation and trial 
stages. When a n  advocate is faced with a trial 
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, he has 
the inclination and opportunity to watch the cases 
to see which errors are consistently harmless and 
which are not. Where the trial task and individual 
("The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely 
to convict."). It is difficult to include under that umbrella 
the suggestion that a prosecutor is somehow bound not 
to take advantage of evidence which that prosecutor 
bows will be considered "harmless" even if it might be 
technical constitutional error. 
'56The prosecutor's potential as a force for the pres- 
ervation of constitutional values is twofold. While the 
prosecutor has an obvious role in refusing to present 
evidence which will result in reversible error, in many 
instances the prosecutor also can be effective in directing 
law enforcement policies and activities. 
'" Any suggestion that the office of prosecutor presents 
a unique circumstance in which the office holder has an 
obligation to suppress constitutionally infirm evidence or 
at least refuse to argue its harmlessness is based on a 
misunderstanding of the adversary system in fact, and 
probably in theory. See, rg., Milton'v. Wainwright, 407 
U.S. 371, in which at least one prosecutor argued "harm- 
lessness first" all the way to the Supreme Court. It is the 
prosecutor's continuing stake in the merits and ability to 
profit from consistent "harmless" decisions in lieu of a 
victory on the merits that helps to make the doctrine of 
harmless constitutional error particularly pernicious. 
ecutors respond to what they read. 
In State v. Jones, 277 Minn. 174, 152 N.W.2d 67 
(1967), the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed a convic- 
tion because of prosecutorial misconduct. Among other 
items the prosecutor argued to the jury the failure of a 
witness to answer certain questions. Id. at 183, 152 
N.W.2d at 74. The reversal was, however, the result of 
multiple sins. State v. Russell, 282 Minn. 223, 164 
N.W.2d 65, cnl. denied, 396 U.S. 850 (1969), concerned 
an improper argument wherein the prosecution alluded 
to the defendant's failure to call witnesses. The court 
said, "we do not approve," but refused to reverse because 
the remainder of the evidence was so overwhelming. Id. 
at 228,164 N.W.2d at 68. In each of the next seven years, 
the court had at least one occasion to tell prosecutors that 
it was error to comment upon a defendant's failure to 
call witnesses, and in no instance did it reverse for that 
reason. Most of the cases come from the same prosecutor's 
office. All but one came from the three major metropol- 
itan prosecutors' offices. While it cannot be shown that 
the continued comment on the failure to call witnesses is 
a direct result of the failure of the court to reverse, the 
court kept affirming and the prosecutors kept comment- 
ing. See State v. Spencer, 31 1 Minn. 222,248 N.W.2d 915 
(1976) (defendant's testimony); State v. Redd, 310 Minn. 
145, 245 N.W.2d 257 (1976); State v. Fields, 306 Minn. 
521, 237 N.W.2d 634 (1976); State v. Meadows, 303 
Minn. 76, 226 N.W.2d 303 (1975); State v. Caron, 300 
Minn. 123, 218 N.W.2d 197 (1974); State v. White, 295 
Minn. 217, 203 N.W.2d 852 (1973); State v. Bell, 294 
Minn. 189, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972). 
Two related lines of cases show the same tendency for 
"repeat business," or prosecutorial conduct which is "dis- 
approved" but for which the Coup continuously refuses 
to reverse. See generally State v. Shupe, 293 Minn. 395, 
196 N.W.2d 127 (1972). Shupe disapproved the prosecu- 
tor's implication to the jury that he would have provided 
more evidence but for some circumstance. In at least 
three subsequent cases the same comment was disap- 
proved without reversal. In State v. Thomas, 307 Minn. 
229, 239 N.W.2d 455 (1976), the court acknowledged 
that its admonition to prosecutors in a 1933 case regard- 
ing the misrepresentation of the presumption of inno- 
cence was going unheeded. It did not reverse But said it 
would henceforth. Eight cases later it had not reversed 
and gave no indication that it ever would. 
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possibilities: (1) the evidence or technique does not dent.Im The harmless possibility, then, tempts a 
involve any error, (2) if the evidence or technique 
involves error, it will be harmless, and (3) the 
evidence or technique involves error that will cause 
a reversal because the remainder of the evidence is 
not "overwhelming." What should the intelligent 
and conscientious risk assessor do? The first two 
possibilities present no question. If there is no error 
there is no problem, and if the error is harmless the 
only problem is the time and expense of an appeal. 
The result is the same: a legal conviction. Convic- 
tions which are legal are, after all, what the society 
pays the prosecutor to obtain. The third choice is 
the problem. The court has defined a doctrine of 
harmless constitutional error which says to a pros- 
ecutor that if the case is not overwhelming any 
error will cause a reversal, and if it is overwhelming, 
no worry. The prosecutor then looks at the case 
and determines that it is not very strong. Use of 
the evidence or technique has two chances of suc- 
cess-no error and harmless-and one chance of 
failure. By the Court's definition of "harmless," 
that one chance of failure demands that the evi- 
dence or technique be crucial to the prosecutor's 
case. The prosecutor has no advocate's choice 
which mitigates in favor of not using the evidence 
or technique. Even if the prosecutor believes the 
case is strong, the likelihood is that the evidence or 
technique will be used. The odds are still two-to- 
one. Further, the advocate's predilection to cover 
every base is reinforced by the doctrine's admoni- 
tion: if the evidence or technique is not needed by 
the advocate it is not likely to cause a re~ersa1.l~~ 
The effect of the rule upon the government's 
advocate is particularly significant. Prosecutors are 
among the most deterrable of groups. If any of the 
Supreme Court decisions of the last quarter century 
have a deterrent effect, prosecutors are the prime 
group to respond. Not only are they affected di- 
rectly by reversals, they are sufficiently trained and 
have sufficient time to fully appreciate the prece- 
15' Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969), was, 
according to Justice Douglas, just such a case. His view, 
represented by Justice Marshall's dissent in Schneble v. 
Florida, 405 U.S. at 433, was that the Harrington evi- 
dence was merely cumulative. The confession in Milton 
v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, seems another example of 
just one more piece of evidence which a prosecutor placed 
upon an  already very large pile. The best proof that 
prosecutors are likely to use all they have, even if they 
don't need it, is the number oftimes that appellate courts, 
by finding harmless constitutional error, have said that 
the prosecutor used evidence that wasn't needed. 
group that might in its own self interest be a 
significant force for preserving the constitutional 
right and, in addition, influence law enforcement 
to-do the same. 
The prosecutor's position with respect to a con- 
stitutional right which may lead to error exempli- 
fies the last, and most ironic, problem with the 
harmless constitutional error doctrine. Harmless 
error exists only as a means of judicial economy, 
and harmless constitutional error does not even 
economize judicial time or activity.161 The judicial 
economy theory assumes that a rule which allows 
reversal only when the error is substantial will 
diminish the number of retrials and thus cut iudi- 
., 
cia1 time and speed matters to con~lusion. '~~ 
The harmless constitutional error doctrine, as it 
affects the prosecutor, contributes to court conges- 
tion. Although quantification is impossible, the 
doctrine clearly causes some diminution in the 
prosecutor's concern that abrogation of a consti- 
tutional right will cause a reversal. Consequently, 
the prosecutor will use the evidence or technique 
in a number of cases which, without the doctrine, 
he would not. Each such case represents one trial 
which, without the doctrine, might not have taken 
place. In the event of a conviction, an appeal is 
almost guaranteed because there is an obvious 
constitutional error. If the prosecutor was right and 
the error was, indeed, harmless, the net effect of 
the use of the evidence under the shield of the 
doctrine is one more appeal. If, on the other hand, 
the prosecutor's guess was wrong, and the error 
was harmful, there is one more appeal and one 
more trial, where, without the doctrine there might 
One of the major complaints about the extension of 
the exclusionary rule has been that policemen have nei- 
ther the training to understand it nor do they find 
themselves in situations in which their action can be 
affected by an arcane judicial precedent. See Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Prosecu- 
tors, on the other hand, are the specific group at which 
exclusionary deterrence might properly be aimed. 
161 E~ p~rical . - proof of economy is virtually impossible. 
Professor Saltzburg, supra note 4, at  1032 n. 158, presents 
an interesting view of the de minimus effect of harmless 
error in criminal trials in the federal system. Nothing in 
either the cases or the literature presents a detailed 
argument for the proposition that harmless constitutional 
error presents the same judicial economy claimed for 
harmless common error. 
See generally State v. Link, 289 N.W.2d 102 (Minn. 
1979). 
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have been no trial in the first instance. There is no 
instance in which the harmless constitutional error 
doctrine encourages prosecutors not to file cases 
which would not othenvise be tried, and many 
chances for the filing of additional cases because 
the doctrine exists. 
The effect of the doctrine on trial courts also 
contributes to court congestion and works against 
the rationale that supposedly supports the doctrine. 
To  the extent that the doctrine encourages a trial 
judge to allow evidence even though it is likely 
error to do so, the doctrine destroys another oppor- 
tunity to diminish litigation. In some cases, if the 
trial court suppressed the evidence, the prosecutor 
would decline to proceed. To  whatever extent the 
doctrine discourages the suppression, it increases 
the number of trials. In addition, each time the 
failure to suppress involves a constitutional error, 
it almost guarantees an appeal and another full 
record hearing in the appellate court before the 
litigation is laid to rest because the error was 
harmless. 
Moreover, it is not clear that the harmless con- 
stitutional error doctrine contributes to judicial 
economy at the appellate level. Undoubtedly, some 
cases are not retried because the court found error 
but found it harmless. How large that number 
might be is as difficult to ascertain as some of the 
other possibilities which have been discussed. It is, 
however, fair to observe that in order for the error 
to be harmless the case against the appellant must 
be "ovenvhelming" without the error. If the gov- 
ernment's case is that good-and the defendant 
has already seen it succeed once-the chance for a 
plea after the appeal is enhanced. If the court finds 
the error and does not have the harmless error 
doctrine to fall back on, the government is more 
interested in the defendant's plea than it was before 
trial. Whatever the number of retrials avoided by 
the harmless constitutional error doctrine, it is 
diminished by the increased likelihood of a plea if 
the doctrine is abandoned. 
Importantly, when the error in question is con- 
stitutional rather than common, any resulcant trial 
economy is offset by the certainty of the increase in 
appeals. While a defense attorney may persuade a 
defendant that a truly insignificant common error 
is not an adequate foundation for an appeal, that 
same result is not likely when both the lawyer and 
the defendant know the Constitution is implicated. 
The net economy effect of the doctrine upon ap- 
pellate courts and trial courts cannot be left with- 
out noting that the issue of harmlessness raises yet 
one more determination from which the defendant 
might take yet one more appeal. For every trial 
that the harmless determination might save, there 
is an appeal to be spent?63 
- - 
A last unique aspect to constitutional error dif- 
ferentiates it from common error when the judicial 
economy argument is made for a harmless error 
doctrine.   he major reason for including the crim- 
inal trial within the original harmless error rule 
was the prevailing practice among defense attor- 
neys of putting error in the record as a hedge 
against a guilty verdict.'64 The effect of that system, 
which provided the only litigant with an interest 
in never reaching a decision a technique to forever 
forestall the reaching of a decision, was to never 
reach a decision. Constitutional error, however, is 
beyond the control of the defense lawyer for the 
most part. It is difficult to place a bad search, a 
bad statement, a bad lineup, the failure of counsel, 
or other government error into the,record. The 
need for a harmless error rule to avoid retrials 
caused by defendants does not exist for constitu- 
tional error. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The harmless constitutional error doctrine shares 
neither history nor logic with the harmless error 
doctrine from which it was wrenched in Chapman. 
It offers neither logic nor method for finding proof 
for the proposition that judicial economy results 
from the operation of the doctrine. Indeed, the 
doctrine arguably contributes to the amount of 
- 
judicial time spent on criminal cases. Unfortu- 
nately, the doctrine enjoys great popularity with 
appellate courts as a mechanism for reducing the 
strict enforcement of criminal constitutional pro- 
cedure rules. 
The effect of the doctrine upon precedents defin- 
ing constitutional criminal procedure-their crea- 
tion, maintenance, and change-is devastating. As 
to constitutional rights there should be no harmless 
error?65 The Court should adopt a rule of auto- 
Constitutional error presents the added possibility 
of federal habeas corpus. But see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 
465 (1976) (ending federal habeas corpus in fourth 
amendment cases). Insofar as many jurisdictions have 
two levels of appellate courts, and the federal habeas 
procedure might involve three levels of review, a strong 
argument can be made that it takes more time going up 
the ladder to resolve the harmlessness issue than it would 
take to go back down and try the case without the error. 
'@ See note 14 supra 
'65 Chief Justice Burger concedes that thejudicial econ- 
omy realized by saving one jury trial is outweighed by 
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matic reversal, fulfill its function with respect to 
the Constitution, and make its judgments in full 
light of the undiluted effect of the rules it makes. 
A terrible symbolic price is paid for maintenance 
of a harmless constitutional error rule. There is a 
visceral, if nonlegal distaste for the proposition that 
an individual's loss of a constitutional guarantee, 
protected only by the courts, can somehow be 
"harmless." An improper search of a home should 
not be equated with a state's omission of the word 
"the" from the defendant's charging papers. Law- 
the interest in safeguarding the rights of the individual 
defendant. Writing for a unanimous court in Standefer 
v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1999 (1980), the Chief Justice 
held that the civil doctrine of nonmutual estoppel would 
not be applied in criminal cases because the "important 
federal interest in the enforcement of the criminal law" 
outweighed the "economy concerns that undergird the 
estoppel doctrine." Id. at 2008. In distinguishing the 
criminal from the civil, he concluded with an approving 
quotation of the Court of Appeals rationale for that 
distinction: 
"The purpose of a criminal court is not to provide a 
forum for the ascertainment of private rights. Rather 
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yers should pause at the proposition that govern- 
ment can violate a basic restriction upon itself and, 
through a court, tell the individual who was the 
beneficiary of the restriction: "no harm-no 
There is something disquieting about the admis- 
sion that constitutional rights are so often abro- 
gated that we need a separate doctrine to excuse 
some of them so that our decisionmaking system 
will not break down. Finally, there is some shame 
in trying to explain how the loss of a constitutional 
guarantee is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt- 
five-to-four. 
it is to vindicate the public interest in the enforce- 
ment of the criminal law while a t  the same time 
safeguarding the rights of the individual defendant. 
The public interest in the accuracy and justice of 
criminal results is greater than the concern for judi- 
cial economy. . . ." 
Id. (emphasis added) The judicial economy concern in 
both the nonmutual estoppel situation and in the harm- 
less constitutional error case is exactly the same: one jury 
trial. 
166 <<  No man ought certainly to be a judge in his own 
cause, or in any cause in respect to which he has the least 
interest or bias." THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (A. Hamilton). 
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